



# CORONERS COURT OF QUEENSLAND

## FINDINGS OF INQUEST

**CITATION:** Inquest into the deaths of  
**Raghe Mohamed Abdi,  
Zoe Dorothea Antill &  
Maurice Frederick Antill**

**TITLE OF COURT:** Coroners Court

**JURISDICTION:** BRISBANE

**FILE NOS:** 2020/5350; 2020/5356; 2020/5357

**DELIVERED ON:** 17 April 2025

**DELIVERED AT:** Brisbane

**HEARING DATES:** 17-21 July 2023, Brisbane  
13 March 2024, Brisbane

**FINDINGS OF:** Stephanie Gallagher, Deputy State Coroner

**CATCHWORDS:** Coroners: inquest, stabbing, killing and  
death in police operations.

**REPRESENTATION:**

**Counsel Assisting:**  
Ms Sarah Lane

**Graeme Antill and Howard Antill for the Antill family:**  
Mr Matt Jackson, instructed by Townsville Community Law Inc.

**Mohamed Abdi:**

Mr Terry O’Gorman, Robertson O’Gorman Solicitors

**Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service (QPS):**

Mr Michael Nicolson, instructed by QPS Legal Services

**QPS members Lavery, Ross, Burkhardt, Brennan and McCann:**

Mr Craig Pratt, Gilshenan & Luton Legal Practice

**Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Director-General of Security Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO):**

Mr Peter Melican, instructed by Australian Government Solicitors

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## Introduction

1. Maurice Antill was 87 years old and his wife, Zoe Antill, was 86 years old when they were killed at their home at 59 Ulinga Crescent, Parkinson in Queensland. They were killed in what was apparently a random attack by a young Australian-born Muslim man, Raghe Abdi, who was being monitored by the Queensland Joint Counter-Terrorism Team (QJCTT). Raghe was on bail for various minor Commonwealth offences relating to an investigation into whether he was preparing to be involved in a foreign incursion. He was living with his father and family members and was required to wear an electronic monitoring device (EMD) as part of his bail conditions.
2. On the afternoon of 16 December 2020, the Queensland Police Service (QPS) was notified that Raghe's EMD had been tampered with. QPS and family attempts to locate Raghe that afternoon and evening were unsuccessful – his family told QPS that he had left home following an altercation with members of the family, and he had left his mobile phone, laptop and wallet with his sister. He did not return home that night.
3. On the morning of 17 December 2020 QPS received reports from motorists that there was a man walking along the verge of the Logan Motorway. QPS attended, and when they approached the man, he pulled a knife from his pocket and advanced on the officers, yelling "Allahu akbar". The QPS Officers retreated and called on the man to drop the knife, but he charged and was shot dead by the QPS Officer. The man was later identified as Raghe Abdi.
4. Later that afternoon, Maurice and Zoe were found dead in the back yard of their home. They had each been stabbed multiple times in the neck and torso. Raghe had their car keys in his pocket when he was shot. The clothing that he had been wearing when he left home was found in Maurice and Zoe's wheelie bin, and the clothing Raghe was wearing when he was shot was later identified as having come from Maurice and Zoe's house. The knife he was carrying appeared to have come from a set in their kitchen.
5. Raghe Abdi was 22 years old when he died on the Logan Motorway at Drewvale, in Queensland. He left no explanation for his actions, and there has been no link found between him and Maurice and Zoe.

## Coronial jurisdiction

6. In respect of the circumstances of Maurice and Zoe's deaths, I determined, pursuant to s28(1) of the *Coroners Act 2003* (the Act), that it was in the public interest to hold an inquest.
7. Raghe's death was determined to be a death in custody, and accordingly an inquest was mandatory pursuant to s27(1)(a)(i) of the Act.
8. In accordance with s45(2) of the Act, the Coroner is required, if possible, to make the following findings at the conclusion of this inquest:
  - a. the identity of the deceased;
  - b. how they died;
  - c. when they died;
  - d. where they died; and

- e. what caused their deaths.
9. After considering all of the evidence presented at the inquest, findings must be given in relation to each of these matters to the extent that they are able to be proved. An inquest is not a trial between opposing parties but an inquiry into the death (or suspected death). Lord Lane CJ in *R v South London Coroner; Ex parte Thompson* (1982) 126 S.J. 625 described a coronial inquest in this way:
- “...an inquest is a fact finding exercise and not a method of apportioning guilt. The procedure and rules of evidence which are suitable for one are unsuitable for the other. In an inquest it should never be forgotten that there are no parties, there is no indictment, there is no prosecution, there is no defence, there is no trial, simply an attempt to establish facts. It is an inquisitorial process, a process of investigation quite unlike a criminal trial where the prosecutor accuses and the accused defends,”... (and) ... “the function of an inquest is to seek out and record as many of the facts concerning the death as [the] public interest requires.”*
10. The Act authorizes a coroner to make preventative recommendations (s46) but prohibits findings being framed in a way that appears to determine questions of civil liability or suggest a person is guilty of any criminal offence (s45(5)).
11. S37 of the Act provides that “the Coroners Court is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself in any way it considers appropriate”. This flexibility has been explained as a consequence of being a fact-finding exercise rather than a means of apportioning guilt: an inquiry rather than a trial. However, the rules of evidence and the evidential cornerstone of relevance should not be disregarded and in all cases, the evidence relied upon must be logically or rationally probative of the fact to be determined.<sup>1</sup>
12. A coroner should apply the civil standard of proof, namely the balance of probabilities, but the approach referred to as the *Briginshaw* scale is applicable.<sup>2</sup> This means that the more significant the issue to be determined, the more serious an allegation or the more inherently unlikely an occurrence, the clearer and more persuasive the evidence needed for the trier of fact to be sufficiently satisfied that it has been proven to the civil standard.<sup>3</sup>
13. It is also clear that a coroner is obliged to comply with the rules of natural justice and to act judicially.<sup>4</sup> This means no findings adverse to the interest of any party may be made without that party first being given a right to be heard in opposition to that finding. As the High Court made clear in *Annetts v McCann* (1990) 65 ALJR 167 at 168, this includes being given an opportunity to make submissions against findings that might be damaging to the reputation of any individual or organisation.

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<sup>1</sup> See Evatt, J in *R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott* (1933) 50 CLR 228 at 256; Lockhart J in *Pearce v Button* (1986) 65 ALR 83, at 97; *Lillywhite v Chief Executive Liquor Licensing Division* [2008] QCA 88 at [34]; *Priest v West* [2012] VSCA 327 at [14] (Coroners Court matter) and *Epeabaka v MIMA* (1997) 150 ALR 397 at 400.

<sup>2</sup> *Anderson v Blashki* [1993] 2 VR 89 at 96 per Gobbo J

<sup>3</sup> *Briginshaw v Briginshaw* (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361 per Sir Owen Dixon J

<sup>4</sup> *Harmsworth v State Coroner* [1989] VR 989 at 994; Freckelton I., “Inquest Law” in *The Inquest Handbook*, Selby H., Federation Press, 1998 at p 13

14. Further, by s46(1) of the Act a coroner may, whenever appropriate, comment on anything connected with a death investigated at an inquest that relates to:
  - a. public health or safety;
  - b. the administration of justice; or
  - c. ways to prevent similar deaths from happening in similar circumstances in the future.

## **Investigation**

15. Three inter related investigations were carried out by the QPS as a result of the three deaths.
16. I note the QCJTT had been monitoring Raghe after his release on bail, which will be discussed further below. The QJCTT is a tri-agency taskforce between the QPS, and two Commonwealth agencies: the Australian Federal Police (AFP); and the Australian Security Intelligence Agency (ASIO). Once the deaths occurred, the QPS took the lead in respect of investigating the deaths, with the QCJTT taking a supporting role in the investigations.

## **Homicide Investigation**

17. A homicide investigation into Maurice and Zoe's deaths was conducted by Detective Inspector Chris Knight of the QPS Homicide Investigation Unit. Det. Insp. Knight provided a report of his investigation to the court.
18. This investigation gathered witness statements, closed circuit television (CCTV) and dashcamera footage, which allowed QPS to determine Raghe's movements after he left his house on 16 December 2016. The crime scene was examined, as were devices used by Raghe. In addition, Det. Insp. Knight obtained an opinion from Dr Levi West, the Director of Terrorism Studies at Charles Sturt University, Canberra, in relation to Raghe's beliefs and ideologies.

## **ESC Investigation**

19. An investigation by the QPS Ethical Standards Command (ESC) and the QPS Security and Counter Terrorism Command (SCTC) concentrated on the circumstances of Raghe's death. A report was provided to the court by Detective Acting Senior Sergeant Donna Green, which outlined her investigation. The ESC interviewed witnesses, including the officers who fired the shots and officers from the QJCTT who had been monitoring Raghe. Statements were taken from members of Raghe's family. Body worn and dash camera footage of Raghe's movements and of his final moments was obtained and reviewed.
20. Det. A/S/Sgt. Green obtained expert opinion evidence from Chief Inspector Corey Allen of the QPS Operational Training Service (OST) in respect of whether the lethal shooting of Raghe by QPS officers was in accordance with QPS training, policies and procedures.

## **SCTC Investigation**

21. The QPS SCTC also carried out an investigation to determine whether there was any threat of terrorist acts. This investigation was conducted by Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) Detective Acting Chief Superintendent Roger Lowe of the QPS Intelligence Crime and Intelligence Command and a report of the investigation was provided to the court. The report outlines investigations carried out by the SCTC after Raghe's death to determine whether there was a threat to public safety.

## **Inquest**

22. The inquest was held over 6 days on 17 – 21 July 2023 and 13 March 2024. 17 witnesses were called to give evidence, including each of the QPS lead investigators, the two QPS officers who fired shots at Raghe, a counter-terrorism expert and a forensic psychiatrist.
23. The brief of evidence, which included the material obtained during the three investigations into the deaths, as well as expert opinion obtained by the court, was tendered at the inquest and made available to those who were given leave to appear.
24. The following issues were explored during the inquest:
  - a. Examine the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Maurice and Zoe Antill at their residence on or around 16 December 2020;
  - b. Examine the circumstances leading up to the shooting of Raghe Abdi by QPS Officers on 17 December 2020;
  - c. Whether the engagement and monitoring of Raghe Abdi by State and Commonwealth law enforcement officials prior to and following his release from custody in September 2020 was sufficient;
  - d. The sufficiency of the monitoring and response by the Queensland Police Service to alerts related to Raghe Abdi's EMD, including the tamper alert on 16 December 2020;
  - e. Whether the applicable QPS policies and procedures associated with EMD, the response to alerts and associated notifications are sufficient;
  - f. Consider whether the actions of the attending police officers, who were involved in the shooting of Raghe Abdi, were appropriate in the circumstances; and
  - g. Consider the adequacy of the QPS investigation into the deaths.
25. After the inquest hearing was finalised, written submissions were provided by the parties who had been given leave to appear. I thank each of these parties for their helpful and considered submissions.

## Consideration of issues

26. In considering each issue, I will set out the evidence relevant to each issue which was given at inquest and/or was obtained during the coronial investigation.

### **Issue 1 – The circumstances of Maurice and Zoe’s deaths; and**

### **Issue 2 – The circumstances leading up to the police shooting of Raghe**

27. It is convenient to consider the first two issues together.

#### **Maurice and Zoe**

28. Maurice Frederick Antill was born in Cumnock, NSW on 11 November 1933. Zoe Dorothea Antill was born in Sydney, NSW, on 10 July 1934. They met in their late teens and were married in 1955. They had lived at 59 Ulinga Crescent, Parkinson, since the late 1990s, and were the owners of an aluminium products manufacturing business. Maurice and Zoe’s son, Graeme Antill, advised investigators that his father was still relatively active around the home, but that his mother had been in and out of hospital because of falls, and needed a walking frame or walking sticks to walk. The couple had various health issues but had been able to remain living independently with some assistance from OzCare nurses and a house cleaner. Graeme would come around every Friday and deliver and put away their grocery shopping. Maurice and Zoe got on well with their neighbours, who would also check in on them and sometimes mow their lawn.
29. Graeme gave a statement in which he said that his parents did not leave the house much because of his mother’s mobility problems, they would go out to medical appointments, but otherwise would mostly stay home. They were very regular in their habits. They would usually keep the doors to the house locked, except for the patio sliding door which was left open during the day so their Jack Russell Terrier, Penny, could go in and out of the house as she needed. The patio door would be locked every night when they went to bed, but this might be quite late in the evening. Graeme said that his parents did not like to leave the house, or even go outside, after dark. Graeme last saw Maurice and Zoe on Friday 11 December 2020 when he delivered their groceries.
30. Endorsed Enrolled Nurse (EEN) Margie Bantolino, employed with OzCare Aged Care and Community Services, visited Zoe three times a week to provide nursing services to Zoe, including changing the dressing on a pressure sore. EEN Bantolino last saw Zoe and Maurice on Monday 14 November 2020. She arrived at their house at around 9am, as usual, having called Maurice first to advise that she was on her way. She left about 9:15am.
31. Graeme and Maurice exchanged texts on 15 December 2020.
32. On Thursday 17 December 2020, when he did not receive the usual weekly shopping list from his father, Graeme began to worry. He called his parent’s mobile and landline but got no reply.
33. On 17 December 2020, EEN Bantolino was scheduled to visit Zoe at around 9am. She called their home phone at around 8am but got no answer, so left a message on voicemail. She tried another couple of times, and then tried the

mobile, but got no answer on either line, which was unusual. When EEN Bantolino arrived at the house she noticed that the blinds in Maurice and Zoe's bedroom were closed, and inside the house was dark. Usually Maurice and Zoe would be up and dressed when she arrived, and their blinds would be open. EEN Bantolino rang the doorbell but there was no answer. EEN Bantolino rang OzCare's Clinical Nurse (CN), Jennifer Law, and said that it seemed that Maurice and Zoe were not home. CN Law made enquiries with a number of hospitals and with the Maurice and Zoe's GP. She was advised by the GP that they had an appointment at 2:10pm that day. While they waited to see if Maurice and Zoe would attend the GP appointment, CN Law tried to contact Maurice and Zoe at home, and also tried to contact Graeme on his landline, but he could not be contacted on that number.

34. When Maurice and Zoe failed to attend their GP appointments, CN Law called the Calamvale Police Station and asked for a welfare check to be conducted upon return. The Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) was tasked to conduct the welfare check. QAS officers arrived at Maurice and Zoe's house at 3:30pm. When one QAS Officer checked the back yard, he found Maurice and Zoe's bodies and called for QPS to attend.
35. At 3:45pm, Senior Constable Marc Burkhart and Constable Timothy Brennan of the Calamvale Police Station attended Maurice and Zoe's address following a report by the QAS crew. The security screen door to the back patio had been pushed out of its runners and was leaning on a piece of exercise equipment on the patio. Zoe was lying on the patio, and Maurice was lying in the yard, near the pool. There was not much damage or disturbance inside the house, and all of the doors and gates were still locked, with the exception of the broken patio door. Their Holden sedan was parked inside the garage. Clothing, shoes and a cap were found in the red council wheelie bin at the side of the house. S/C Burkhart declared a crime scene and an investigation into the deaths was commenced.
36. At around 6:40pm that night, QPS Officers attended Graeme's house to tell him that Maurice and Zoe had been found dead in their home.

#### Autopsies

37. On 19 December 2020, forensic pathologist Dr Nadine Forde conducted an autopsy consisting of an external and partial internal examination on Maurice's body. On 20 December 2020 Dr Forde conducted an autopsy consisting of an external and full internal examination on Zoe's body. CT Scans, toxicology and histology testing were conducted in both cases, as well as neuropathological examinations.
38. Dr Forde made the following findings in relation to Maurice:

*External post-mortem examination showed an elderly man with multiple blunt and sharp force injuries, predominantly to the head, face, neck and torso.*

*The head showed multiple blunt force injuries including a cluster of parallel linear abrasion/lacerations to the right side of the face and associated bruising with numerous underlying skull and facial fractures and a fractured odontoid peg (C2 spine fracture).*

*The brain was examined by a neuropathologist and showed traumatic brain injury including contusions and subarachnoid haemorrhage.*

*There were 25 stab wounds clustered around the anterior neck, chest and upper abdomen. There were also 15 small punctate wounds to the torso, likely representing superficial sharp force injuries. Underlying involved organs and structures included the larynx, trachea, oesophagus, thyroid, superior vena cava, heart, right coronary artery, right lung, aorta and liver with associated right haemothorax and small haemopericardium.*

*Most of the sharp force wounds had a front to back direction with minimal horizontal or vertical deviation. The maximum depth was in the wounds to the abdomen at 12 cm, however, as the abdominal wall is compressible, this is an estimate only, and the blade may have been shorter.*

*There were no sharp force injuries to the hands typical of defence-type injuries.*

*There was severe coronary atherosclerosis, confirmed on histology.*

*Histology of a few select injuries showed no evidence of inflammation, in keeping with occurring in the perimortem period.<sup>5</sup>*

39. Dr Forde made the following findings in relation to Zoe:

*External post-mortem examination showed an elderly female with multiple blunt and sharp force injuries, to the face, neck, chest abdomen and upper limbs.*

*The head showed multiple blunt force injuries including oblique, parallel, linear abrasion/lacerations to the forehead and associated with underlying facial and skull fractures with bone penetrating into the left frontal lobe.*

*The brain was examined by a neuropathologist and showed traumatic brain injury with frontal lobe contusions and lacerations and subarachnoid haemorrhage. There were also changes in the brainstem consistent with idiopathic Parkinson's disease.*

*There were 24 stab wounds to the head, neck and torso, most of which were in a central (midline) distribution from neck to abdomen. There were also 3 incised wounds to the face and 7 small punctate wounds to the torso, likely representing superficial sharp force injuries.*

*The stab wounds involved numerous structures including the sternum, rib, larynx, heart, lungs, liver and cervical vertebrae. There was a large haemopericardium (blood in the sac around the heart) and small haemothoraces (blood in the chest cavity).*

*The wounds had a front to back direction, most had minimal horizontal or vertical deviation, but some showed right to left direction, particularly the wounds to the left chest. There was a maximum depth of approximately 15 cm.*

*There were at least 13 sharp force injuries to the hands including three full-thickness stab wounds, and 10 incised wounds consistent with defence-type wounds.*

*There were a number of other minor superficial injuries to the body, some of which may have been older.*

*There was a pacemaker in situ, and the lungs showed some emphysematous changes.<sup>6</sup>*

40. Dr Forde made the following conclusions in relation to both Maurice and Zoe:

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<sup>5</sup> A3.3 – Autopsy report, p 21.

<sup>6</sup> A2.3 – Autopsy report, p 21.

*It is not possible to determine the order in which the injuries were sustained.*

*While there is known natural disease, the injuries are of a severity that death would have occurred regardless of pre-existing conditions.*

*The pattern of parallel linear lacerations to the head may be the result of multiple blows from an elongated or edged object such as a metal bar or some similar implement, or may be due to a smaller number of blows from an object with multiple parallel linear ridges, bars or prongs.*

*Given the presence of extensive fractures, at least some of the blunt force injuries to the head would have required severe force, even in the setting of osteoporosis.*

*It is possible some of the skull or facial fracture may have occurred from falling or collapsing to the ground.*

*Given that many of the stab wounds penetrate skin and soft tissue only, a mild to moderate degree of force would be required, however when penetration of bone has occurred (rib, sternum and cervical vertebrae), moderate to severe force would be required.*

*The sharp force wounds show no specific pattern other than being consistent with having been made by a knife, such as the one shown to me in police photos, or some similar sharp implement. The injuries are not so dissimilar that they could not have been inflicted by single implement, but the possibility that there was more than one implement being used cannot be excluded.*

*Given the distribution of sharp force wounds to the neck, chest and torso, (to the front of the body, predominantly near the midline), the deceased may have been lying on [his or her] back, on the ground, possibly incapacitated in some way, when many of these were inflicted.*

*Both deceased sustained a similar pattern of injuries with severe blunt force trauma to the head and a similar distribution of sharp force wounds to the neck, chest and torso... The similarity raises the possibility that the injuries were inflicted by a single person, but the possibility that there was more than one assailant cannot be excluded based on the autopsy findings alone.*

*It is not possible to determine the order in which the victims sustained their injuries or died.*

*It is not possible to determine a specific time of death, although her pacemaker showed intrinsic rhythm on 16/12/2021.<sup>7</sup>*

41. Dr Forde concluded that the cause of death for both Maurice and Zoe was:

1(a) Multiple blunt and sharp force injuries.

### **Homicide Investigation**

42. An investigation into Maurice and Zoe's deaths was conducted by Det. Insp. Knight, who gave evidence at the inquest.

43. Det. Insp. Knight reported that, on the evening of 17 December 2020, a link was established between the Antills' deaths and the QPS shooting of a young man, Raghe Abdi, on the Logan Motorway that morning. A Holden motor vehicle key located in Raghe's pocket at the time of his death was found to be the key to the

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<sup>7</sup> A3.3 – Autopsy report, p 22 and A2.3 – Autopsy report, p 22.

Antills' car, which was still parked in their garage. Further investigations found that: a knife that Raghe had brandished at QPS Officers before he was shot was consistent with a brand of knives owned by the Antills, Raghe was wearing clothing belonging, to a member of the Antill family when he died, and the clothing found in the Antills wheelie bin at their house was identified as the clothing Raghe had been wearing when he left his home the day before.

44. During his investigation Det. Insp. Knight obtained witness statements, residential CCTV and dashcam footage, which allowed QPS to determine Raghe's movements after he left his house on 16 December 2016. The crime scene was examined, as were devices used by Raghe.
45. At the same time, investigations were being conducted into Raghe's shooting by QPS by QPS ESC and the SCTC.

## **Raghe Abdi**

### Background

46. Raghe Mohamed Abdi was born in Brisbane, Queensland on 25 May 1998. He was the first child of his parents, Mohamed Abdi and Hoda Aden. Mr Abdi and Ms Aden were born in Somalia. Mr Abdi came to Australia in 1994 because of persecution during the civil war in Somalia. He sought and was granted asylum in Australia. In 1998, Mr Abdi sponsored Ms Aden to come to Australia.
47. In Australia, Mr Abdi obtained a Bachelor of Social Science and Human Services, as well as a Masters of Social Work and Social Administration and a Graduate Diploma of Conflict Resolution. In 2020, Mr Abdi was employed as a social worker and was studying a Masters of Business Administration.
48. Mr Abdi and Ms Aden had four girls after Raghe was born. Raghe went to primary school at Kuraby State School and to high school at John Paul College. Raghe's parents separated a number of times during his childhood, and broke up in 2014, when he was 16. After this, Raghe and his sisters lived with their father.
49. Ms Aden remarried Mohamed Aden. They have two children together – Raghe's step-siblings Nasreen and Noah. Mr Abdi remarried Bahsan Abdullahi, and their son, Raghe's youngest step-brother, was born in 2019.
50. Raghe finished high school in 2015, and Mr Abdi gave a statement in which he said that Raghe passed his subjects and was a hard worker. He had been well liked by students and teachers and had been involved in school committee work while he was a student. A good friend of his from school, Omar Abdel Aziz Ahmed, said that Raghe was a funny guy who was smart and passionate. He played soccer and did Taekwondo and Brazilian Jujitsu. Mr Aziz Ahmed said Raghe was quite conservative, and didn't smoke, drink alcohol or date.
51. Raghe attended Mosque at the Kuraby Mosque regularly through his school years. Raghe's friends and family confirmed in their evidence that he was a conservative Muslim, who did not approve of playing music or shaking hands with unmarried women. Raghe's sisters said that he always prayed 5 times a day and would tell them that they should do the same as it was one of the pillars of Islam. The majority of his friends and family did not consider him to have extremist views.

## University and interest in Islam

52. In 2016 Raghe commenced studying a Business degree at the University of Queensland (UQ). His friend Mr Aziz Ahmed said that, in his first year of University, Raghe was still the same type of person he had been at school. Raghe's parents noted that at university, he started to show an interest in learning more about Islam. In early 2016 Raghe told his parents that he wanted to go to Saudi Arabia or the Sudan to study at an Islamic university. Ms Aden was worried and thought that Raghe wanted to be 'Al-Shabaab'<sup>8</sup> (an Islamic militant group in Somalia associated with Al-Qaeda). Raghe told his mother that if he wanted to be Al-Shabaab, he would go to Syria. He said that there was no Al-Shabaab in Saudi Arabia, just a good university, and that scholarships were offered to Islamic students living in the west. Mr Abdi told Raghe that, if he finished his university studies in Australia first, then Mr Abdi would discuss with him, his attending an overseas Islamic university. Mr Abdi said that Raghe was not happy with his fathers' decision but, he did accept it.
53. Towards the end of 2016, Raghe became part of a group of young men and boys at the Kuraby Mosque who met with Za'id Abdus Samad, an Australian-born Muslim. Mr Abdus Samad was trying to organise for the group to go to Syria and fight in support of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (The Syrian plan).<sup>9</sup> At that time, QPS had obtained information that Raghe was selling iPhones as a way of raising funds for the group. Around the end of 2016, one of the boys told a family member, who reported the activity to the Imam of the Mosque. The Imam advised the congregation against going to fight in Syria, and said it was wrong to do so. The plan was abandoned, and some of the older members of the group, including Raghe, stopped going to the Mosque in early 2017.
54. On 8 January 2017, Raghe made a report to QPS saying he had been the victim of a robbery at knife point while he was out for a run. He said that three offenders took an iPhone 7 from him. QPS spoke to Raghe and to Ms Aden and concluded that the report was likely to have been made up by Raghe as he had lost or misplaced his mother's phone.
55. In April 2017, ASIO agents interviewed Raghe, in relation to his "religiously motivated violent extremist ideology and intent to travel offshore to engage in politically motivated violence". ASIO advised the court that their interest in Raghe dated from 2015.
56. Mr Aziz Ahmed said he noticed a change in Raghe in 2017 during their second year of university. Raghe stopped going to the gym and doing martial arts and put on weight. He started going out to clubs and smoking Shisha (Hookah tobacco) with Mr Aziz Ahmed and their friends.
57. Raghe transferred from UQ to the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) for 2017 and commenced studying Engineering. He was at QUT for one semester, and in second semester 2017, he went to Central Queensland University to study aviation.

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<sup>8</sup> Al-Shabaab was proscribed as a terrorist organisation under the *Criminal Code (Cth)* on 22 August 2009.

<sup>9</sup> ISIS was proscribed as a terrorist organisation under the *Criminal Code (Cth)* on 11 July 2014.

58. A friend of Raghe's from Taekwondo and the Kuraby Mosque, Sharma-Arke Abdulle, says that in 2018 Raghe "left university and decided he wanted to focus on his religion. He did a lot of self-study and research into Islam. He stopped going to the movies and listening to music."<sup>10</sup> Another friend who knew Raghe, Kais Itawi, said that in February 2018 he noticed that Raghe had become more extreme in his religious views, and spoke about taking part in armed conflict and waging jihad.
59. On 26 May 2018, officers from the QJCTT photographed Raghe in company with Mr Abdus Samad. Mr Abdus Samad was under investigation for "committing historic offences relating to preparations for foreign incursions",<sup>11</sup> namely, the failed Syrian plan. One of the boys who was part of Mr Abdus Samad's group at the Kuraby Mosque had an appointment to speak to QPS about Mr Abdus Samad. On the morning of the appointment, Raghe went to the Kuraby Mosque and spoke to the boy. Raghe asked him whether he had seen Mr Abdus Samad recently, and then drove the boy to Mr Abdus Samad's house. The three of them walked in the park next door, and that was when they were photographed. Mr Abdus Samad spoke to the boy about his QPS interview and told him that "he should tell the police the truth, and not make up a lie that [Mr Abdus Samad] was forcing him to go to Syria".<sup>12</sup> Raghe drove the boy back to the Mosque after the conversation.
60. In early June 2018, Raghe applied for, and was issued, a passport. Ms Aden said that she and Raghe had been planning to travel to Somalia to visit Ms Aden's mother, who was sick. The trip did not take place as Ms Aden's mother died before they could go.
61. On 30 June 2018, Mr Abdus Samad was charged with offences under the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth) in respect of the Syrian plan. Raghe and Mr Itawi were identified as the two other adult members of the group, but there was insufficient evidence to charge either of them. No charges were brought against the three underage members of the group. In respect of Raghe, the QJCTT could not identify sufficient evidence of any 'acts of preparation' by Raghe, nor identify any direct evidence that Raghe 'maintained an intention' to travel to Syria in the relevant period.
62. Mr Itawi said in his statement, and confirmed in his evidence at inquest, that Mr Abdus Samad's arrest:
- ...really shook Raghe up he spoke about travelling to Somalia to hide from Australian authorities. He wanted to run away from Australia.*<sup>13</sup>
63. In July 2018, Raghe was enrolled in a Bachelor of Engineering (Honours)/Bachelor of Computer Science at Griffith University's Gold Coast Campus. He later withdrew from his courses for that trimester and did not enrol for trimester 3 of that year.
64. On 10 September 2018, Raghe was taken to the Royal Brisbane and Women's Hospital (RWBH) Emergency Department (ED) at 1:30 in the morning by QAS.

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<sup>10</sup> C1.55 – Statement of Sharma-Arke Abdulle.

<sup>11</sup> B3 – QJCCT Report, para 15.

<sup>12</sup> The source of this quote is not published in these findings in order to protect the identity of a person who was a child at the relevant time.

<sup>13</sup> C1.61 – Statement of Kais Itawi, paras 14 – 15 and Transcript, Day 1, T66L3.

The RWBH notes say that Raghe was found acting bizarrely, and that when he arrived in the ED he was confused, refused all cares, was violent at times, and when he tried to get up, he walked into a wall. An Emergency Examination Order (EEA) was initiated by hospital staff and security were called. When Raghe was searched by security, a 30cm-long kitchen knife was found in his jacket. Raghe was kept in hospital overnight, and eventually was able to tell doctors that he had taken drugs, but would not say what type of drug he had ingested. He was assessed as fit to be discharged after breakfast the following morning, and he was picked up by a friend. This was the only event of any note in Raghe's medical history.

65. On 3 October 2018 Raghe was called as a witness to a closed Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) hearing during the investigation of the "suspected murder of Abdul Basith Mohammed at Kuraby in the State of Queensland on or about 25 October 2017".<sup>14</sup> The CCC cannot provide further information about Raghe's involvement in this matter, but it is clear from other material that Abdul Mohammed was Mr Abdus Samad's Uncle, and Mr Abdus Samad was alleged to have murdered him.
66. In September or October 2018, Raghe spoke to Mr Itawi in the car on their way to university. He spoke about getting a fake passport so as to leave Australia. At the time Raghe was studying Electrical Engineering, and he told Mr Itawi that one reason for this study was "to get capability to use drones".<sup>15</sup> Raghe said he wanted to go to Sudan or Somalia. A few weeks later they met at the Logan Mosque and Raghe again said he wanted to travel to Sudan or Somalia, because he thought it would be easier to hide. He said that he had been talking to a guy who had come from Somalia to Australia, who said that Al-Shabaab and Islamic State were "upon the truth".<sup>16</sup> These conversations concerned Mr Itawi, who thought that "his extremism reached a point that made me believe that an agency in Australia needed to know about him to do something".<sup>17</sup>
67. On 29 October 2018, a report was made to the National Security Hotline about Raghe by an anonymous caller. The caller said that Raghe, who was a student at Griffith University, had been had engaged in conversations with another Somali about whether ISIS and Al-Shabaab were justified. Subsequent investigations by the QJCTT suggested that Raghe had told associates he wanted to travel to the middle east of Somalia to make 'jihad' (holy war) and had discussed "how to best benefit the mujahedeen (those engaged in jihad)".<sup>18</sup> This report was recorded by QJCTT as an incident entitled 'Verbal support for ISIS and Al-Shabaab – Qld'.
68. QPS records show that on 14 November 2018, Raghe was identified as 'wanted for questioning' in relation to the sale of two fake iPhone 7s for \$850 in September and October 2017 (the fraud offences). It appears that QPS had obtained CCTV footage and had been able to identify Mr Aden's car as the offender's vehicle. Further enquiries suggested that Raghe had been driving the car on the relevant dates and times.

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<sup>14</sup> B1.87 – Email CCC Executive Director Crime Hearings.

<sup>15</sup> C1.61 – Statement of Kais Itawi, para 18.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, para 19.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> B3 – QJCTT Report, para 25.

69. By late November 2018, Raghe had re-enrolled in his course at Griffith University and was to commence on 25 February 2019.
70. In early 2019 the QJCTT commenced Operation Slangenburg, which was aimed at preventing or disrupting terrorist activities carried out by Raghe. As part of the operation, a border alert was put in place for Raghe.
71. On 15 January 2019 a “flag” was put on Raghe’s QPS record which was titled ‘BOLO’ (be on the look out):

*\*\*\*DO NOT BROADCAST\*\*\* Abdi is subject to JCCT Operation SLANGENBURG. Prior to any action you must contact DSC Charles Edwards on W (02) 5216 7404 M 0400533346.*

*Operations Slangenburg – relates to preparations for travel to Syria to engage in hostile activities (QI2000356215)<sup>19</sup>*

72. On 20 March 2019, an arrest warrant was issued for Raghe in relation to one of the iPhone fraud offences. There was insufficient evidence for the QPS to charge for the second, as they did not have clear footage of the person driving Mr Aden’s car on that occasion. It seems that from this point, QPS attended Mr Abdi’s house on a number of occasions looking for Raghe in relation to the warrant.
73. On 25 March 2019, Raghe went to the Logan Police Station as QPS Officers had been looking for him. Mr Abdi had told Raghe he should go and talk to the QPS. Raghe was issued a notice to appear at the Beenleigh Magistrates Court in relation the fraud charge. Mr Abdi said that:

*I see the beginning of Raghe’s ‘troubles as starting with the fraud charge that was put upon him. While that charge was eventually discontinued in the Magistrates Court, it did create a lot of fear and anxiety for him and I think that is where there complications began for him. Up until that time he was engaged with his studies and was not actually showing any fear or anxiety towards the system but as soon as the fraud charge was put upon him I noticed that he experienced increasing levels of anxiety’.<sup>20</sup>*

74. Mr Abdi also said that Raghe was concerned that a fraud conviction would “finish” his life and any chance of a professional career.
75. Mr Abdi recalled that Raghe went to court unrepresented on the date in the notice to appear, and that he was told his file was not before the court and that QPS would be in touch with him. QPS records have confirmed this, as there is a note in the incident log for the arresting officer as follows:

*Paperwork was not transferred to court after you arrested ABDI and executed arrest warrant. Matter was not heard in court because of this. Please locate ABDI and recommence proceedings.<sup>21</sup>*

76. On Thursday 2 May 2019, Raghe was issued a fresh notice to appear at the Beenleigh Magistrates Court on 12 June 2019 in relation to the fraud charge.

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<sup>19</sup> B1 - Coronial Report, pp 46 and B1.91 – QPRIME Occurrence QP17017835.

<sup>20</sup> B1.47 – Statement of Mohamed Abdi, para 29.

<sup>21</sup> B1.90 – QPRIME Occurrence QP1701731084, p 5.

### Attempt to travel to Somalia

77. On Sunday, 5 May 2019, Raghe told Ms Aden that he had bought a one-way plane ticket to Somalia and was leaving on 7 May 2019. Ms Aden asked him where he got the money for this, and he said he had sold a TV that he had at his father's place. Ms Aden also knew that Raghe had recently sold a car belonging to her husband that had been used by Raghe. Ms Aden was worried and spoke to her brother in America, who told her to let Raghe go, as he would realise life was not easy in Somalia and would come back to Australia. Raghe saw his friend, Mr Abdulle that day and told him that he had booked a flight to Somalia on 7 May 2019. He asked Mr Abdulle to give him a lift to the airport and Mr Abdulle agreed.
78. On Monday, 6 May 2019,<sup>22</sup> Raghe and Mr Abdi had a falling out. Raghe had been staying at Ms Aden's for the weekend, with his sister. At the end of the weekend, Raghe didn't take his sister back to his father's place. Apparently she wanted to stay with her mother. This led to conflict between Raghe and his father, who said that Raghe was interfering with the custody arrangements that he had made with Ms Aden, and Raghe should not make decisions about those arrangements without discussion with Mr Abdi first. As a result of this disagreement, Raghe moved his things out of Mr Abdi's house and moved in with his mother.
79. On the morning of 7 May 2019, Mr Abdulle picked Raghe up from Ms Aden's house. They went to Officeworks where Raghe bought some things for the flight. When Mr Abdulle dropped Raghe at the international terminal, Raghe gave him a bag of clothes and book and said he could take whatever he wanted and give the rest to Ms Aden. He also gave Mr Abdulle a Xiaomi mobile telephone, and:
- ...asked [Mr Abdulle] to destroy this mobile telephone by putting it in hot water. Raghe said he wanted [Mr Abdulle] to do this because he said something like "there's things that are not supposed to be there" on the mobile telephone, which [Mr Abdulle] took to mean that there was something illegal contained on the mobile telephone.<sup>23</sup>*
80. Mr Abdulle took the phone home with him and boiled it in a pot of water for about half an hour.
81. The border alert for Raghe was triggered in the early hours of that morning, and QJCTT obtained information that Raghe was booked on a flight from Brisbane to Singapore at midday. His ongoing flight was to Hargesia in Somalia, via Ethiopia. QJCTT Officers attended the airport. After he checked in, Raghe's baggage was examined by Australian Border Force (ABF) staff, and Raghe was arrested by QJCTT Officers on suspicion of foreign incursion offences.
82. During a recorded interview, Raghe told QJCTT Officers that he was going to Somalia to visit his sick grandmother, and that he only had enough money for a one-way ticket. He said that his mother would organise the return ticket for him, and that she was going to do that once the lunar sighting has happened for the Eid festival, so that he would be able to stay for Eid. He said he was going for

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<sup>22</sup> In his affidavit in support of Raghe's 2<sup>nd</sup> bail application (H30), Mr Abdi says that he thinks this falling out occurred about 2 weeks before 7 May. Ms Aden gives the date of Monday 6 May in her statement. Ms Aden's version appears closer, as when QJCTT Officers spoke to Mr Abdi on 7 May he said Raghe had moved out about three days beforehand (H15).

<sup>23</sup> H14 – Statement of Sharma-Arke Abdulle, para 17.

Ramadan and would be staying with his mother's family. He didn't have any details for the family but had a number to call them on when he arrived in one of his phones. He had an Apple Laptop and three new phones with him. He had \$530 in cash, and his mother had given him some gold jewellery to give to her family to thank them for his stay. He said he was studying Electrical Engineering at Griffith University but had had to defer because of ongoing problems with migraine headaches.

83. QJCTT Officers also questioned Raghe about the group at the Kuraby Mosque, and Raghe said it was a social group who would hang out together between afternoon and evening prayers during the university holidays. He denied any involvement in Mr Abdus Samad's plans, and said he was "gobsmacked" when Mr Abdus Samad was arrested. He said the only travel they had talked about was applying for a scholarship offered by a local mosque and Islamic association (the United Muslim Brotherhood) to study in Sudan. Raghe denied that he supported ISIS or politically motivated violence. During the interview with Raghe, Qantas advised QJCTT Officers that they had had to let the flight leave without Raghe.
84. A search warrant was executed on Ms Aden's house and QJCTT officers spoke to her about Raghe. She said that he was a good son, and he was going to Somalia to live in an Islamic country and learn more about Islam. Ms Aden had arranged for Raghe to stay with her cousin Qorane in Mogadishu. Qorane did not have a mobile phone and used her neighbour's phone. Raghe was taking 3 phones overseas with him – one to give to Qorane so Ms Aden could communicate with her, one for himself to use, and one to sell in case he needed money. She had also given him her gold to support himself. Ms Aden expressed concern that Raghe might be going to Somalia to join Al-Shabaab, but said he had denied this. She said he was currently attending Holland Park Mosque, but she was not sure if he attended other prayer or study groups. She said she was relieved that he had been stopped from travelling.
85. A search warrant was also executed on Mr Abdi's house, and on Mr Abdulle's car. The boiled mobile phone was recovered from Mr Abdulle and sent for analysis, but it had been successfully destroyed. That phone was Raghe's usual mobile phone, the number for which was known to the QJCTT. Two of the three phones Raghe had with him were brand new and contained no information. The third, a Nokia, had only one contact saved, for 'Hinda', with two phone numbers and a Gmail address for 'ragheabdi2'. The MacBook Raghe had with him had been wiped and restored to factory settings, as had one he had left at Ms Aden's house.
86. The QJCTT did not have enough evidence to charge Raghe with any Counter-Terrorism offences, and he was released in the early hours of 8 May 2019 to his mother's house. ASIO issued a recommendation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Raghe's passport be suspended on the basis that ASIO considered he may travel to engage in politically motivated violence.
87. Raghe spent most of his time over the next few days, after his release, at home. He was on his and his sister's mobile phone looking things up or making calls to people. One morning, he came into Ms Aden's room at 4am and woke her up. Ms Aden described their interaction as follows:

*...[Raghe] said you know what, I'm not gonna hide my religion, I believe in ISIS. At that stage I didn't know exactly what the word ISIS stood for, I knew they were bad people*

*and were a terrorist organisation. Raghe said these are the people who will go to Jannah. Jannah means paradise or heaven.*

*I said to Raghe, how could you believe in such a group, do you believe in killing innocent people? He said believe in jihad and that jihad is a duty of every Muslim but that he will never kill an innocent person. I asked him when did he join these people, by this I mean follow ISIS, and he told me that he knew who he was since he was 14 years old. He said that if a person is kuffar, then you have to tell them that they are kuffar.*

*I asked Raghe about whether there is a difference between ISIS and Al-Shabaab. He said that they are very similar but the current leader of Al-Shabaab is bad and not doing what the Quran says, but the old leader of Al-Shabaab was good. He said that ISIS is good because they follow what the Quran says.*

*After he had told me these things, I think that when he was trying to go to Somalia that he was lying to me about just going to live in an Islamic country, I think he was actually going to join this group because he said that is what he believes in.*

*Raghe then told me that me, Elwat, Ekran, Mohamed Aden and Mohamed Abdi are 'kuffar'. This means Christians or non-believers (people who don't believe in Allah). I told him if I am kuffar then what should I do? He told me that we need to seek forgiveness from Allah.*

*He also said it was haram to vote. Haram means, against the religion. He told me not to vote in the election and he also said that it was haram to listen to Judge's or go to Court. He said this was the other reason he was running away from home, he told me he has to hide from the police.*

*I said to Raghe, show me in the Quran where it says it is ok to kill innocent people. Raghe said the Quran says you can do Jihad.<sup>24</sup>*

88. On 20 May 2019, AFP Officers involved in Operation Slangenbung went to Ms Aden's house to speak to Raghe. Raghe told the officers he was enrolled in university and intends to move out to shared accommodation as soon as he could afford it. He said he didn't intend to travel again. He asked when his passport and the other items seized from him would be returned. He did not admit to the AFP officers that he had a mobile phone (they were aware he was using a phone which was subject of an interception order).
89. The same AFP officers spoke to Mr Abdi later that day. Mr Abdi told them he hadn't spoken to Raghe directly, but that Ms Aden had told him that Raghe wanted to get his computer back so he could sell it and buy another airline ticket. Mr Abdi said that he believed that people at the United Muslim Brothers Mosque, which Raghe had been attending, were a bad influence on Raghe.
90. On 23 May 2019, Raghe again came into his mother's room at four in the morning. Mr Aden had tried to talk to him about ISIS and said they were against Islam. Raghe said that Mr and Ms Aden mocked their religion and were Kuffar, so he couldn't stay with them. After that conversation, Ms Aden rang Mr Abdi to tell him what had happened.
91. Mr Abdi rang Raghe's QJCTT Case Officer just before 2pm that day. The Case Officer recorded in his case note of the conversation that Mr Abdi reported that Raghe was going to move out, and didn't want to live with either of his parents

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<sup>24</sup> B1.41 – Statement of Hoda Aden, paras 40 – 46.

as they were 'non-believers'. Mr Abdi said that he was concerned about the 'non-believers' comment and about Raghe's mental health. During his evidence at inquest Mr Abdi said that he did not recall saying to the Case Officer about that he was concerned about the 'non-believers' comment, and only recalled advising that he was concerned about Raghe's mental health. Mr Abdi did not accept, during cross-examination by Counsel for the Director General of Security and the Commissioner of the AFP, that the Case Officer's contemporaneous note would be likely to be more accurate than Mr Abdi's memory of their conversation.

92. Following this conversation, the QJCTT Officer checked the position of Raghe's mobile phone, and found it was still at his mother's house. Later that day Raghe packed his things, locked them in his Mazda in the carport, and told his mother he would be back to get the car later.
93. On 24 May 2019, Ms Aden opened a letter which had arrived for Raghe and found that his passport had been cancelled and he was required to surrender it. The next day, which was Raghe's 21<sup>st</sup> birthday, Raghe was at home and he and Ms Aden had an argument about his attitude and views. Raghe left the house, and Ms Aden contacted his case officer as she was concerned about his welfare.
94. On 26 May 2019, Ms Aden gave a statement to Officers about Raghe and her concerns. On the same day, QJCTT Officers placed a new 'flag' on Raghe's QPS record, which replaced the previous BOLO from January:

*Police to approach with caution and exercise officer safety. Please report all contact to Brisbane* [REDACTED]<sup>25</sup>

95. On 27 May 2019, Raghe contacted QJCTT case officers on a new mobile number. He arranged to meet with them at the Southbank Police Station at midday. He said he was staying in temporary accommodation in South Brisbane and had a discussion with officers during which they offered support, such as assistance referring him to community organisations. He gave them his current mobile number and was reported to have been compliant.
96. As a result of that contact with Raghe, the QJCTT referred Raghe to the QPS Engagement and Diversion Program (EDP). The EDP is a Qld Government prevention initiative that supports individuals to disengage from behaviour that may lead to violent extremism. The EDP offers tailored supports to the persons referred and to their families. Engagement with the EDP is voluntary.
97. On 10 June 2019 a Muslim Officer from the EDP, Senior Constable Aydin Ozden,<sup>26</sup> met with Raghe. During their conversation, S/C Ozden advised Raghe that his role was to support Raghe by linking him to relevant social support services in the community and to assist him to live in a positive manner. They discussed Raghe's upcoming court appearance on 12 June 2019, and what would happen if he didn't attend. Raghe said that he would not attend because he did not recognise the court process due to his religious beliefs. He said that if an arrest warrant issued as a result, so be it. They discussed Islam and its relationship to justice systems. S/C Ozden offered to meet Raghe on 12 June

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<sup>25</sup> B1.41 – Statement of Hoda Aden and H20 – Email summary – Call to police from Hoda Aden.

<sup>26</sup> At the time of the inquest, Ozden had left the QPS and was a Leading Senior Constable in the AFP. He is referred to in these findings by his role and rank at the time of his engagement with Raghe.

and take him to court. Raghe could not be persuaded to change his mind. In his evidence at inquest S/C Ozden recalled that, during this conversation, Raghe was polite, but “not engaging to a certain extent. Very limited communication with me. Not interested.”<sup>27</sup>

#### Fail to appear and arrest

98. On 12 June 2019, Raghe failed to appear in the Beenleigh Magistrates Court in relation to the fraud charge. A warrant was issued for his arrest, and he was arrested later that day and taken to the Brisbane Watchhouse. He had his new mobile phone with him. QJCTT Officers obtained a warrant to search the phone.
99. On 13 June 2019, Raghe was brought before a Magistrate on the failed to appear charge but refused to acknowledge the authority of the court due to his religious beliefs. He was remanded in custody to re-appear on 15 July 2019. Had it not been for his refusal to acknowledge the court and sign a bail undertaking, he would have most likely have been given bail.
100. On 14 June 2019, QJCTT Officers had an interview with Raghe at the Watchhouse, during which they showed him the search warrant for his phone and an order that he assist them to access the phone (s3LA(2) order) and asked him to give them the pin number to access the phone. Raghe refused and officers seized his phone. The AFP Digital Forensics team was unable to access the phone without the pin number. On 17 June 2019, Raghe was issued with a notice to appear for failing to comply with a s3LA(2) order. Raghe was remanded in custody on this offence and the failure to appear.
101. On 18 June 2019, Raghe was transferred to the Brisbane Correctional Centre and was assessed by a prison psychologist. The psychologist made the following observations of Raghe:

*Prisoner ABDI presented calm and stable, with appropriately reactive affect. He described his mood as “ok”, and mood was assessed to be euthymic. Nil hygiene deficits were observed. He presented to the assessment willingly, and was polite and cooperative at all times. His speech was fluent, and appropriate in rate, tone, and volume. There was no evidence of disorganisation noted. His eye contact was direct and appropriate, culturally considered. The prisoner did not appear to be responding to external stimuli during the assessment and there was nil evidence of formal thought disorder or gross mood disturbance. He reported adequate sleep and denied significant changes to his appetite. The prisoner reported strong external support from his mother, and positive future orientation to resume studying whilst in custody.*<sup>28</sup>

102. Raghe communicated with his parents by phone from prison. He also received visits from his father and other family members. In a number of phone calls with Ms Aden, Raghe told her that he could go to jail for 10 years on a charge of preparations for incursions, and that QPS had relied on her statement and another statement in order to get the s3LA(2) order. He repeatedly asked her to withdraw her statement, saying “...If you retract your statement they will stop the thing because there isn’t much for them to go with”.<sup>29</sup> In a phone call on 26 June 2019, Raghe and Ms Aden had the following exchange:

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<sup>27</sup> Transcript, Day 3, T7L45.

<sup>28</sup> D2 – QCS records – ABDI 2, p 1.

<sup>29</sup> H28 – SOF – ABDI – Pervert justice charges, para 16 and H31 - Bail Application Defence exhibits, p 1.

Raghe: *Mother did you withdraw it? You just go to the station and say you want to withdraw it.*

Ms Aden: *I am waiting a lawyer. Dad is getting a lawyer.*

Raghe: *Ok not a problem.*

Ms Aden: *How many years did they say?*

Raghe: *It is maximum 10 years. Just make sure you withdraw your statement.*

Ms Aden: *How many years did they tell you?*

Raghe: *It can be up to 10 years.*

Ms Aden: *So they didn't judge you yet, did they?*

Raghe: *Yes, anyway I do not talk to them and our judge [indistinct] but is your statement they have used. Anyway it is not a problem.*

Ms Aden: *Do I need a lawyer? Is Dad getting a lawyer?*

Raghe: *Mother you don't need a lawyer, you only need to withdraw the statement. Don't waste your money.*

Ms Aden: *He's the one wasting his money, why do you care?*

Raghe: *Because Mum I am not talking to the Judge... Whether I am staying in here for 20, 30, or 50 years I am telling you that, they had very little on us before, little things like the fraud but when you said that stuff they made it 10 years for us.*

Ms Aden: *If you are not talking to them who are they going to judge?*

Raghe: *That is not my issue, my issue is your statement. If you do not want to stand up before Allah on the day of judgement and you do not want Allah to reject you and not sighting the hell, what you scared of, that you seeking forgiveness from Allah and you will be returning with your stuff because Allah will not forgive that kind of things. I will be holding this against you on the day of judgment, whether you are my mother or it does not matter. That is wrong, you throw away your religion, and you have to fix all of these things. I am going to call you in three days. Do my things.<sup>30</sup>*

103. Raghe also made four phonecalls to Mr Abdulle during which he asked him to withdraw his statement before his next court appearance.

104. On 8 July 2019, during a telephone call, Raghe asked Mr Abdi to take Ms Aden to the QPS station to withdraw her statement. Mr Abdi subsequently took Ms Aden to the Fortitude Valley QPS Station. Ms Aden gave the following account of that event:

*I have previously provided a statement to Police concerning Raghe on 26 May 2019. At one point whilst in jail Raghe pressured me to withdraw that statement because it talked about his behaviour and beliefs but I stand by that statement as accurate and true. Mohamed ABDI also pressured me to withdraw the statement as well. We walked into the police station in the Valley. I don't remember the date. Raghe was still in jail at that time. Mohamed ABDI talked to the police as far as I remember and we spoke with two police in plain clothes. One of the police said "Don't put anymore people in trouble". Mohamed was telling me to lie about my statement and he told the whole community that I had put my son in jail. I didn't call the police so it's not true, but he kept telling me to change my statement. I never changed my statement.<sup>31</sup>*

105. The case officers who met with Mr Abdi and Ms Aden on 8 July at the Fortitude Valley Station recorded their conversation with Raghe's parents, and reported that:

a. *They (Raghe's parents) informed police that ADEN wished to withdraw her statement;*

<sup>30</sup> H25 – Objection to bail affidavit, p 6 and H31 - Bail Application Defence exhibits, pp 4 - 5.

<sup>31</sup> B1.42 – Addendum statement of Hoda Aden, p 3.

- b. *They were informed that it was not possible to 'withdraw' a statement but that an addendum statement could be taken to correct the original;*
- c. *They were asked directly whether their son ABDI had requested ADEN to attempt to withdraw her statement, to which they both replied he had not; and*
- d. *They were informed that all calls made from the Brisbane Correctional Centre are recorded, as per the automated message at the start of every call.<sup>32</sup>*

106. In a telephone call with Mr Abdi on 9 July 2019, Mr Abdi asked Raghe if he knew the telephone calls from prison were recorded, and Raghe said he did. Mr Abdi asked Raghe to co-operate with him as he and Ms Aden were making enquiries to try to help him, and Raghe said "Let me tell you the truth, I have been very honest with you, I am not going to change and I am not going to court".<sup>33</sup>

107. Mr Abdi said in his statement that he thought Raghe's failure to co-operate was due to mental health issues rather than extremism. He explained that:

*During the period that Raghe was in jail which was approximately from about June 2019 to when he was released in September 2020 he went through patterns of behaviour which I put down to his fluctuating mental health. His behaviour fluctuated from one period to the next in relation to his views on the Court system. There were times when he was cooperating with the Court system and also occasions when he was not.*

*I see the explanation for the times of non-cooperation with the Court as reflecting a deterioration in Raghe's mental health. During that time I used to visit Raghe in jail and would talk to him on the phone from time to time. Sometimes when I visited Raghe at jail he was rejecting of me. On other occasions he was opinionated in his dealing with me at the jail and then on other occasions he was very rational on my jail visits, very reasonable and cooperative.*

*One of the things that stood out for me in my dealings with Raghe while he was in jail was what I saw as deterioration in his mental health. He became preoccupied with punishment and going into hellfire and he would say "If I do this I'll go in hellfire".*

*I would engage with Raghe when he expressed these opinions and that is reflected in some of the taped phone calls that occurred between me and Raghe while he was in jail.<sup>34</sup>*

108. On 17 July 2019, AFP Senior Operational Psychologist Dr Natalie Davis provided the QJCTT with her psychological advice/assessment of Raghe. The QJCTT had requested this assessment of Raghe in May 2019. Dr Davis' assessment was provided to the court during the inquest. Her conclusions about Raghe were as follows:

*ABDI has continued to support violent jihad and a desire to travel overseas, likely to engage in hostile activities. He has some organisational and planning skills and stated he had enrolled in a university course to increase his skills and experience to use drones and to fight overseas. His beliefs appear to have been long-held since the age of 14 years, and he continues to remain supportive of violence to achieve his aims. He has very few protective or mitigating factors which would assist with his withdrawing support for violent jihad, and those he does possess (his family) have little influence in mitigating his behaviour.*

*Mr ABDI may be desensitised to violence and harm of others, and with his violent beliefs and support, as well as some skills and exposure to violent domestic violence*

<sup>32</sup> H28 – SOF – ABDI – Pervert justice charges, para 32.

<sup>33</sup> H25 – Objection to bail affidavit, p 6 and H31 - Bail Application Defence exhibits, p21.

<sup>34</sup> B1.47 – Statement of Mohamed Abdi, paras 50 - 53.

*behaviour, he may act on his beliefs, or impulsively and opportunistically act out. The overall assessment of his risk is moderate-high to continue to support and/or engage in violent extremism.*<sup>35</sup>

109. On 5 November 2019, the QJCTT referred Raghe to the QPS EDP once more. SC Ozden was assigned Raghe's file, and upon receiving the referral, he contacted Mr Abdi to determine whether Raghe might now be interested in engagement with a case manager from the Program. Mr Abdi agreed and arranged a meeting which would take place after his next visit to Raghe in jail.
110. On 11 November 2019, Mr Abdi met with S/C Ozden and two other staff members of the EDP at the Coffee Club. In his evidence at inquest S/C Ozden said that, during their conversation, Mr Abdi was "very forthcoming, open, and...was seeking support for his son".<sup>36</sup> Mr Abdi said that he would like the EDP to give Raghe assistance once he is released from prison, because Mr Abdi believed that, at that time, Raghe would be isolated and in need of support to integrate back into the community. Mr Abdi said that Raghe did not want to be seen meeting with QPS officers while he was still in prison, as he was concerned about the consequences from other inmates. After this meeting, S/C Ozden was in communication with Mr Abdi again on 22, 25 and 26 November 2019, and tried to organise for officers wearing plain clothes to attend the prison and see Raghe. In his evidence at inquest, Mr Abdi said that he had had a conversation with Raghe, who was initially "ok with the idea for [the police] to go and visit him",<sup>37</sup> but then said that he did not feel safe meeting with police in prison, even if they were in plainclothes, as other prisoners would still be able to tell they were police. Mr Abdi told the court that he told the EDP to contact Raghe's lawyers about the visit, and also suggest that perhaps an arrangement could be made to meet Raghe outside of the prison.
111. On 29 November 2019, Raghe appeared in the Magistrates Court with legal representation and made an application for bail. The Commonwealth objected to bail and handed up bench charges for two Commonwealth offences of Attempting to pervert the course of justice – that is, the prosecution of the failure to comply with the s3LA(2) order and in relation to the attempts Raghe made to get Ms Aden and Mr Abdulle to withdraw their statements. On this occasion, Raghe acknowledged the authority of the court and participated in the process. During discussion with Magistrate Gett, the Commonwealth advised that the State fraud charge had been withdrawn. In respect of the fail to appear, Raghe instructed his lawyer that he had appeared at Beenleigh Magistrate Court on the day but was told he could leave. Magistrate Gett enquired as to whether giving the phone pin code which had been required pursuant to the s3LA(2) order could be made a condition of Raghe's bail, and Raghe gave instructions that he doesn't know the code and therefore could not comply with the order.
112. Magistrate Gett denied bail and gave the following reasons for his decision:

*Whilst noting that there is a presumption of bail for a young man without any criminal history whatsoever, I do take into account the nature of the allegations against the defendant and his conduct that preceded the alleged commission of the first in time charge of 3LA(6) charge and, further, his conduct that seeks to ground the attempt to pervert justice charge, it would seem to me in relation to each of the alleged conducts, which have not been indicated by a plea of guilty or alike, that conduct, in essence,*

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<sup>35</sup> B3.2 – Report of Dr Davis, p 6.

<sup>36</sup> Transcript, Day 3, T9L30.

<sup>37</sup> Transcript, Day 2, T44 – 48.

*seeks to, in some manner or form, deny the law enforcement authorities proper investigation of offences or disturbed offences 5 on foot, being investigated or charged.*

*To my mind, noting the serious nature of the offences and the prior conduct when the defendant was apprehended at the airport and his subsequent conduct as well as his dealing with others and whilst in custody, my concern is that the defendant is an unacceptable risk even when I look at the substantial conditions being proffered and his pre-sentence custody level, that he is an unacceptable risk of failing to appear.<sup>38</sup>*

### Release on bail

113. In August 2020, Mr Abdi briefed a new solicitor on Raghe's behalf. On 3 September Raghe made another application for bail before Magistrate Courtney. During the bail application his solicitor put transcripts of the prison telephone calls before the court, and argued that they showed changed circumstances, in that they showed conversations between Raghe and Mr Abdi discussing how Islam intersects with the law, and that Raghe now accepted that he could engage with the court. The Commonwealth opposed bail. For the purposes of the bail application, Mr Abdi had sworn an affidavit in which he advised that Raghe could live with him if he was granted bail. Raghe was granted bail on the following conditions:

- a. *Surrender into custody at Brisbane Magistrates Court (Court 19) on 18/09/2020 at 9:00am;*
- b. *Reside at 8 Hira Close, Calamvale;*
- c. *Report every Tuesday and Thursday to Calamvale Station commencing 08/09/2020 between 8:00am and 4:00pm;*
- d. *Curfew between 11:00pm and 6:00am;*
- e. *Not to leave Qld;*
- f. *Not to attend within 100 metres of any International Departure point in Australia;*
- g. *Use only one smart phone and must provide the SIM, IMEI, pin code/password to AFP within 48 hours of obtaining the phone; and*
- h. *Attend Brisbane City Watchhouse within 24 hours of bail release to be fitted with a tracking device.<sup>39</sup>*

114. In the days preceding the bail application, QJCTT Acting Team Leader Detective Acting Senior Sergeant Danni McCann made contact with Raghe and Raghe's parents to make arrangements to have Raghe's laptop available to him on release, and to ensure that Mr Abdi had his contact number and knew what supports were available to him through QJCTT.

115. Following Raghe's release, his QJCTT case officers were involved in surveillance of Raghe to ensure he complied with his bail conditions and in respect of the ongoing Operation Slangenborg. There was ongoing interaction between QPS, AFP and ASIO Officers with respect to monitoring Raghe his compliance with his bail conditions.

116. On 4 September 2020, Raghe attended the Brisbane Watchhouse and was fitted with an ankle EMD. Arrangements made by the QJCTT in respect of Raghe's EMD are discussed further below.

117. In an addendum statement, Mr Abdi recalled that:

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<sup>38</sup> H27 – Transcript of bail decision, p 5.

<sup>39</sup> B1 – Coronial Report, pp 38 – 39.

*When Raghe got out of jail his mental health appeared to improve for a period. He was generally engaging and doing online courses at university and he was keeping active by going to the gym. That was particularly obvious for the first couple of months that Raghe was out of jail but then he started to go downhill where he appeared to be reaching a stage of helplessness both because of the surveillance he said he was subjected to and because of other events.<sup>40</sup>*

118. On 17 September 2020, ASIO officers contacted Raghe and requested an interview. ASIO has advised that:

*He declined the invitation and suggested ASIO contact his lawyers should ASIO have any questions. During the interaction Abdi said he believed he had been under sustained surveillance since his release from custody and said 'my actions will speak louder than my words, so ASIO should just watch and see what I do'. QPS officers were present throughout the interaction. ASIO did not contact Abdi's lawyers as suggested as Abdi had already indicated that he did not want to participate in an interview.<sup>41</sup>*

119. ASIO advised the court that their monitoring and physical surveillance of Raghe continued intermittently throughout September, October, November and December 2020.

120. On 5 November 2020 Raghe sent a letter to Mr Abdus Samad in prison. He enclosed an article about how to learn the Quran more efficiently, and asked Mr Abdus Samad to forgive him for not contacting him earlier. Mr Abdus Samad wrote a letter in reply on 12 November 2020, and asked what had been enclosed, as the prison had not allowed him to have it. He spoke about being in prison and said that it was not too bad being there. Raghe wrote back to Mr Abdus Samad on 26 November 2020. He wrote about his own time in prison and his charges and said that he prayed that Mr Abdus Samad would beat his charges. Raghe wrote that he'd been reinstated into his university program and would return to study next year. Raghe shared a number of passages which related to misfortune being because of your own sins, and recommended that Mr Abdus Samad rely on Allah in this difficult time. He wrote his mobile phone number at the bottom of the letter. There is no evidence before the court that Mr Abdus Samad contacted Raghe on his mobile.

121. Mr Abdi gave evidence that he thought that Raghe "was doing very well"<sup>42</sup> until around late November 2020, when he seemed to become withdrawn and paranoid. Raghe told his father that he believed police were following him in cars while his sister drove him to the gym, and that officers sat outside and watched him while he was in the gym. He was also having difficulty getting a job, partly because of his curfew hours, and partly because his charges had been reported online and employers could find out about them if they googled Raghe's name. Mr Abdi also says that Raghe's banks closed his accounts, and this distressed Raghe as he couldn't engage in ordinary day-to-day transactions. Raghe thought that ASIO had told the banks to close his accounts, as he couldn't understand why they would close them down otherwise. Mr Abdi pointed to these events and said they affected Raghe and made him more depressed.

122. Mr Abdi said that, two weeks prior to Raghe's death, he and Raghe had an argument during which Raghe accused him of being partially responsible for the statement that Ms Aden had given to police on 26 May 2019. Mr Abdi told Raghe

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<sup>40</sup> B1.48 – Addendum statement of Mohammed Abdi, para 48.

<sup>41</sup> B2 – ASIO submission, para 21.

<sup>42</sup> Transcript, Day 2, T52L7.

that Ms Aden had contacted him because she was concerned about Raghe, and Mr Abdi said to her “if [you] are concerned about [Raghe’s] welfare [you] should contact the Police”.<sup>43</sup>

123. Raghe caught up with a young man he had met in prison, Montasr Angolo, a few times after his release. Mr Angolo had converted to Islam, and he and Raghe had discussed their faith in prison. Mr Angolo described Raghe as a humble, lovely person. Mr Angolo gave a statement in which he said that he and Raghe had planned to rob a drug dealer who they had been told had a lot of money hidden in his backyard. They were going to go to his property when there was no one home but were taking a knife with them just in case.
124. In early December 2020, Raghe and Mr Angolo went to the house of Mohammed Al-Bahnsawi, an older man Raghe knew from the Kuraby Mosque. It was around midday on a Saturday. Raghe and Mr Angolo wanted to talk to James Yombi, who was at Mr Al-Bahnsawi’s house. Mr Yombi went downstairs with them, and Mr Angolo handed Mr Yombi his phone, which showed a list: “Rope, duct tape, gloves”. Mr Angolo asked Mr Yombi to get these things for them, saying “[me] and my Abdi friend are going to do a little mission later you know”. Mr Yombi refused. Mr Angolo and Raghe then asked Mr Al-Bahnsawi to go with them, and he did. They drove to Woolworths and Raghe gave Mr Al-Bahnsawi \$40 in cash and asked him to buy three pairs of gardening gloves. He did this and brought the gloves back to the car. Mr Angolo said in his statement that eventually he and Raghe decided that the idea of robbing the drug dealer “didn’t feel right” and they stopped talking about it.
125. On 2 December 2020, Raghe’s Commonwealth matters were mentioned at the Brisbane Magistrates Court. At this time, Raghe entered pleas of not guilty to all charges. The committal paperwork was processed and all charges were formally committed to the Brisbane District Court for trial.
126. Raghe’s family said that he mostly kept to himself while he was on bail. He spent a lot of time in his room on the computer. His sisters reported tensions between Raghe and Mr Abdi over Raghe’s inability to find a job.

#### 16 December 2020

127. During the inquest a video produced by QPS investigators was played to the court. This was a video compilation of data from Raghe’s EMD, footage from residential CCTV cameras and Google Earth maps which captured Raghe’s movements, as best as they could be ascertained, from the afternoon of 16 December 2020 to the time of his death on 17 December 2020. The narrative below outlines Raghe’s movements as set out in the video and incorporates information from Raghe’s family in relation to his last interactions with them.
128. Early in on the afternoon of 16 December 2020, Raghe was at home. His step-mother, Ms Abdullahi, asked him to look after his step brother while she did some things on Snapchat for her clothes business. She was playing some Somali music from the TV and recording it for an advertisement for her business, Raghe came downstairs and told her that listening to the music was ‘haram’. This was unusual event as she did not normally listen to or play music in the house, and Ms Abdullahi and Raghe did not usually have arguments. Ms Abdullahi ignored Raghe and continued recording the music. Raghe went back upstairs. He came

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<sup>43</sup> B1.47 –Statement of Mohammed Abdi, para 81.

back down, took Ms Abdullahi's phone, and broke the phone in front of her, saying "I asked you to stop. This is 'haram'". Raghe was angry and talking to himself as he walked away. Ms Abdullahi called Mr Abdi, who said he would come home and deal with the problem. Mr Abdi was quite concerned to hear that Raghe had deliberately damaged the phone, as that was not like him. Mr Abdi tried to call Raghe but he didn't answer. Mr Abdi called Ms Abdullahi, and she said Raghe had taken his sister to the park, which was about 500m from the house. Raghe often took her to the Calamvale District Park after she got home from school. Mr Abdi called another daughter and then drove to the park. The data from Raghe's EMD showed that he left home at 2:34pm. CCTV footage from the area showed that he had a laptop bag with him when he went to the park.

129. Raghe called his sister and said he was at the park and asked her to come and pick him up. She asked him why, and he said he would tell her when she got there. She was at Ms Aden's house and was worried as it was unusual for Raghe to call her to pick him up. She called her sister and told her about Raghe's call. She recalled that Raghe wanted Ms Aden to pick him up. They also drove to the park. Raghe was upset when they arrived. Raghe told his sister he had had an argument with Ms Abdullahi.
130. Raghe and his sister were in the car. When Mr Abdi arrived, he parked in front of her car, blocking it. Mr Abdi tried to talk to Raghe, but Raghe got angry and said he didn't want to talk. He got into his sister's car and told her to drive away. She drove off. Raghe's EMD data shows that they left the park at about 2:55pm. Raghe said he wanted her to drop him off at Ms Aden's house, but she did not want to. She asked what had happened with Ms Abdullahi and why Raghe had broken her phone, and Raghe said that "[Ms Abdullahi] was laughing with her evil laugh and mocking him". Raghe was really upset and shouting, saying "drop me, please drop me, I just want some space, I need to think". She had never seen Raghe this angry, and it was out of character for him. She asked if he was going to hurt himself, but he did not answer. She drove along Algester Road to an area in Parkinson near bushland, outside 24 Nambung Place. Raghe got out of her car here and walked away along the path next to the bushland, leaving his laptop, phone and wallet in her car. CCTV and data from Raghe's EMD show that he left the car at 3:02pm. He was wearing a blue T-shirt with an orange stripe, black track pants and black Adidas sneakers.
131. Data from Raghe's EMD shows that he walked south-east into the bushland. At 3:25pm a tamper alert was sent from Raghe's EMD. Raghe removed his EMD and the EMD showed no further movement.
132. As a result of the tamper alert, an automated notification was sent to Det. A/S/Sgt. McCann's email address at 3:25pm. However, Det. A/S/Sgt. McCann had finished a night shift at 6:00am that morning and was off-shift that afternoon. He didn't have his work mobile with him and was not checking his work emails. Det. A/S/Sgt. McCann confirmed in his evidence at inquest that he did not receive any notification to his personal mobile phone, which he did have with him, and the notification to his work mobile arrived the next day instead of at the time of the alert.
133. His sisters drove around for hours looking for Raghe. They stopped looking at 10 or 11 that night and went home to bed. The next day, they gave Raghe's wallet and laptop to Ms Aden. Raghe's phone was later recovered from the Parkinson Duck Pond.

134. As a result of the tamper alert on Raghe's EMD, Police Communications sent a job to Calamvale Police to do a GPS breach bail check. At 4:02pm, S/C Burkhart and Const. Brennan of the Calamvale Police Station attended Raghe's home. S/C Burkhart drove, and Const. Brennan looked on the QLite to look any flags on Raghe's police file. Const. Brennan saw the flag which said: "Report all *contact* to Brisbane QJCTT" and understood that this meant that Raghe was on the counter-terrorism watch list. The officers spoke to Mr Abdi, who said that Raghe had left to go to the park before Mr Abdi had got home from work. Mr Abdi said that maybe Raghe's EMD was out of batteries. Const. Brennan tried to contact Raghe on his mobile phone but there was no answer. The officers checked the Calamvale Community Park on their way back to the station but could not locate Raghe there. The officers reported back to Communications that they did not locate Raghe and were advised to try again later that day. Both officers confirmed in their evidence at inquest that they did not contact QJCTT as they had not had any *contact* with Raghe themselves.
135. S/C Burkhart and Const. Brennan went back to Raghe's house at 8:14pm, and Mr Abdi told them that Raghe had left the house that afternoon with his sister, in an anxious state, and his sister had let him out of the car somewhere in Parkinson. Again, the officers reported back to Communications that Raghe had not been located.
136. Mr Abdi said in his statement that:

*In relation to the way Raghe reacted to [Ms Abdullahi] on 16 December 2020, there was no history of that kind of reaction from him before. I feel there was some sort of a breakdown and the music triggered him against a background where he was dealing with a lot of other issues that he was not sharing with people and then it came to a head and when I saw him at the park Raghe was yelling and he clearly was not okay. I cannot remember what sort of words Raghe was saying but he was yelling in a voice that I had never heard from him before. He was yelling loudly and I had not seen him act that way towards me ever before.<sup>44</sup>*

137. The bushland in which Raghe's EMD was removed was within walking distance of Maurice and Zoe's address in Parkinson. Sometime between 7:00pm and 7:30pm that evening, Maurice and Zoe's neighbour, Mechelle Ciesiolka, heard a loud bang from out the back of her property, closer to the side that Maurice and Zoe lived. She thought it sounded like a crash against her colourbond fence, or against a tin shed.<sup>45</sup> It was dark at the time and had been raining. She turned on the light out the back but could not see anyone in the yard. She looked from a number of rooms to see if she could see anything but was unable to see anything out of the ordinary. CCTV footage from a property across Algester Road, which captured the back boundary of Maurice and Zoe's property and Ms Ciesiolka's back fence, showed that Ms Ciesiolka's back outside light was switched on at 7:24pm for 7 seconds. Two different internal lights were briefly switched on at 7:25 and 7:26pm.
138. Raghe's movements after he removed his EMD have been established by compiling CCTV footage from various residences in the area, as well as dash camera footage from a number of motorists. He was captured on CCTV footage walking past Maurice and Zoe's property at 7:42pm.

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<sup>44</sup> B1.47 –Statement of Mohammed Abdi, para 93.

<sup>45</sup> Police later tried to recreate the sound and Ms Ciesiolka agreed that when police dropped the lid of Maurice and Zoe's colourbond pool filter box, the sound was very similar.

139. At 7:45pm Ms Ciesiolka's back outside light was switched on again for just over 2 minutes. At 7:51pm an indistinct figure was walking between the back fence and the rear shed of Maurice and Zoe's house. CCTV footage showed that an internal light went on at Maurice and Zoe's house at 8:01pm for 26 seconds, and again at 8:16pm for 6 seconds.
140. At 10:12pm dashcam and CCTV footage captured Raghe walking along Watarrka Drive, Parkinson, near number 41. He was wearing different clothing at this point – a green t-shirt, light-coloured pants rolled up to just below his knees and black shoes. He was walking slowly and deliberately. Watarrka Drive runs next to a strip of bushland which borders the Logan Motorway. Maurice's wallet was later found along the same strip of bushland, slightly to the north of Watarrka Drive.

#### 17 December 2020

141. At 5:29am on 17 December 2020 Raghe was captured on Logan Motorway CCTV footage coming out of the bushland and climbing over the barrier onto the edge of the motorway. He walked east along the motorway on the left-hand side of the road. He continued through the Beaudesert Road interchange, crossed the left-hand exit lanes and stayed on the side of the motorway. He was walking slowly and calmly. By 5:53am he had crossed the eastbound lane and was walking east along the right shoulder of the motorway.
142. Makol Deng was driving along the motorway on his way to work. He saw Raghe walking on the right shoulder of the motorway and thought that it looked dangerous. He thought that Raghe may have been walking because his car had broken down. Mr Deng pulled over and asked Raghe if he was ok. Raghe said he was going somewhere but Mr Deng can't remember where he said. Raghe said he had no money. Mr Deng offered to give him money and to drop him at a train station, but Raghe declined and said Mr Deng should continue his journey. Mr Deng said it was dangerous for Raghe to be where he was, and Raghe said it was dangerous for Mr Deng too. Mr Deng says that Raghe was polite throughout the conversation, describing him as a "gentleman".
143. By 6:12am, Raghe had reached the Gateway interchange. As a number of people had reported seeing Raghe on the motorway, two QPS officers from the Calamvale Police Station, Constables James Ross and Drew Lavery had been tasked to respond. They drove along the motorway until they saw Raghe, and pulled over on the right shoulder of the motorway about 10 metres in front of Raghe, just under the Gateway overpass. The QPS officers did not have any information about the identity of the person they were about to intercept. When the QPS officers got out of the car, Raghe stopped walking. The QPS officers walked towards Raghe and Const. Ross said "It's alright mate", as Raghe started backing away. Raghe had his hands in his pants pockets. Const. Ross pointed out the cars on the motorway and walked between Raghe and the traffic. Raghe continued to back away. He said "Could you leave me alone?". Const. Ross replied "No we can't, because you are causing a traffic hazard". Raghe said that he would get off the road, but when Const. Ross offered to help, Raghe said "I'll get off myself. Can you leave me alone please". While this was happening Raghe continued to walk backwards, and the QPS officers kept pace with him. Const. Ross said "Just stop and talk to me". Raghe repeated "Can you leave me alone please" as Const. Ross advised his name and station. Raghe said "This is your last warning", and then suddenly he withdrew his right hand from his pocket,

brandished a knife and yelled “Allahu Akbar”.<sup>46</sup> Const. Ross and Lavery both drew their handguns and yelled at Raghe to drop the knife. Raghe started walking towards the QPS officers, with each left step yelling “Allahu Akbar” and raising his right hand pointing towards the officers each time he yelled. The QPS officers backed away and repeatedly directed Raghe to stop and to drop the knife. Raghe took thirteen steps towards the QPS officers in this manner, then stopped and shouted something unintelligible while beating his chest with his right fist which was holding the knife. He yelled “Allahu Akbar” one more time, and then charged towards Const. Lavery, shouting “Takbir”.<sup>47</sup> Both QPS officers fired shots at Raghe.

144. The QPS officers attempted first aid after removing the knife from Raghe’s reach and searched him for weapons. Queensland Ambulance Service was called. However, Raghe could not be revived and was declared deceased by QAS at the scene.

### Autopsy

145. On 19 December 2020, forensic pathologist Dr Christopher Day conducted an autopsy consisting of an external and full internal examination Raghe’s body. CT scans, toxicology and histology testing were conducted, as well as neuropathological examination. A forensic pathologist engaged by Raghe’s family observed the autopsy.

146. Dr Day found that there were 7 projectile entrance wounds and 2 exit wounds, as well as minor sharp and blunt force injuries to the body (abrasions, blisters and minor cuts). Dr Day concluded that:

*Projectile entering the torso (chest and abdomen/pelvis) – gunshot wounds to the right outer arm and shoulder, anterior abdomen, left lower abdomen and right mid back...have caused significant injury to internal structures of the chest, abdomen and pelvic cavities, sufficient to cause death.*

*Gunshot wounds to the right thigh and hand...have not involved vital structure.*<sup>48</sup>

147. No alcohol or drugs were found in Raghe’s system.

148. Dr Day concluded that the cause of death was:

1(a) Gunshot wounds to the torso

### **Findings of the homicide investigation**

149. In April 2022, Det. Insp. Knight provided the report of his homicide investigation into Maurice and Zoe’s death to the court. Det. Insp. Knight reported, and confirmed in his evidence during the inquest, that forensic testing confirmed that Raghe had been at Maurice and Zoe’s house as:

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<sup>46</sup> An Arabic phrase meaning ‘God is greatest’.

<sup>47</sup> This Arabic word is the name for the phrase “Allahu Akbar” – ie the “Takbir” is “Allahu Akbar”. Takbir itself means ‘great’, and ‘magnification of Allah’ or ‘to proclaim the greatness of Allah’.

<sup>48</sup> A1.3 – Autopsy report, p 20.

- a. Raghe's fingerprints were found on the outside of the sliding screen door frame, and on blood stains on the screen door (blood identified as Maurice's); and
  - b. Blood and DNA found on the clothing in the red wheelie bin belonged to Raghe (DNA), Maurice (DNA) and Zoe (DNA and blood).
150. On the basis of the information obtained during his investigation, Det. Insp. Knight advised the court that he came to the following conclusions, which he set out in his report:

- i. *No evidence exists to suggest that ABDI had any prior contact with either of the deceased persons Maurice or Zoe ANTILL, or their address at 59 Ulinga Crescent, Parkinson; and*
- ii. *The murders of Maurice and Zoe ANTILL were random.*

Rationale:

- i. *GPS tracking available via ABDI's EMD confirmed it did not approach their address*
- ii. *Analysis of ABDI's communication device/s failed to indicate any connection*
- iii. *No witness evidence draws a link between ABDI and the victims*
- iii. *At the time of ABDI entering the yard of 59 Ulinga Crescent, Parkinson he was not armed with a knife; and*
- iv. *ABDI likely assaulted both Maurice and Zoe ANTILL before entering their dwelling, where he then retrieved a knife, before returning to inflict knife wounds on both victims.*

Note:

- a. *The autopsy reports recognised that blunt and sharp force trauma caused the deaths of both Maurice & Zoe ANTILL. The Pathologist did not provide comment regarding the sequence of the blunt force trauma or knife wounds.*
- b. *The autopsy of Maurice ANTILL observed no evidence of self-defence injuries.*
- c. *Whilst the autopsy of Zoe ANTILL did reveal stab wounds to her hands that may be attributed to self-defence injuries, the blood and position of her body is supportive to suggest she was not mobile during the injuries she received.*

Rationale:

- i. *No witness evidence indicates a habit or propensity for ABDI to carry knives;*
- ii. *At approximately 3:31pm on 16 December 2020 ABDI removed the EMD fitted to his ankle. The device was not cut and sustained no damage from an edged tool / weapon;*
- iii. *Assuming ABDI did not have a knife available when he removed his EMD, no evidence exists to support ABDI having contact with any other person or place, prior to the homicides;*
- iv. *CCTV and evidence from the next-door neighbour indicate that ABDI entered the yard of 59 Ulinga Crescent at approximately 7:51pm*

(16.12.20). Interior lights at the address support that Maurice ANTILL walked outside into his pool yard, where ABDI likely confronted him. It must be noted that both Maurice and Zoe ANTILL were located deceased between the direction where ABDI is observed behind a shed and the only available entry point to the dwelling (assuming the individual on the CCTV is ABDI);

- v. The knife located in ABDI's possession on the morning of 17.12.20 is consistent with the size / dimensions of the knife used to stab both victims and importantly consistent with a knife-set located in the kitchen;
  - vi. I reasonably assume that the available evidence supports a sequence of events whereby ABDI could not have entered the dwelling to access the knife, before first assaulting Maurice and Zoe ANTILL.
- v. The homicides of Maurice and Zoe ANTILL and corresponding unlawful entry of their home was not financially theft motivated.

Rationale:

- i. The only property known to have been stolen from 59 Ulinga Crescent, Parkinson included the 'Thomas Rosenthal' branded knife, car-key, clothing and Maurice ANTILL's wallet;
  - ii. It should be noted that Maurice ANTILL's wallet was recovered after apparently being discarded in bushland on the same route as ABDI is believed to have walked following the homicides;
  - iii. There were clearly visible valuable items of jewellery and cash in open view at 59 Ulinga Crescent, which were not stolen;
  - iv. There is only one identified contact between ABDI and one other individual shortly prior to being fatally shot on the Logan Motorway (17.12.20); and
  - v. At the time of his death no other property was located in his possession (other than keys, knife & clothing).
- vi. The family dispute involving ABDI, his father, step-mother Bahsan ABDULLAH and other members of the ABDI family escalated during the afternoon of 16 December 2020. Those events immediately preceded ABDI removing his EMD at 3:31pm. Once his EMD was removed and the dispute impacted ABDI returning home in compliance with his bail conditions, those events set him on an unplanned course. The decisions of ABDI after the family dispute, led to him entering the yard of Maurice and Zoe ANTILL and ultimately murdering them.
- vii. The investigation failed to identify any forward planning for the homicides.
- viii. No evidence, forensic or otherwise, was identified to suggest involvement in the homicides by any other individual.
- ix. The investigation failed to identify ABDI having contact with any other person after he is viewed getting out of his sister Edil's car at 3:01pm (16.12.20), until the homicide offences occurred shortly after 7:51pm (16.12.20).
- x. The only other person known to have had any personal contact with ABDI after the homicides and before being confronted by Constable LAVERY and Constable ROSS, was witness Makol DENG. DENG pulled his vehicle over and spoke briefly with ABDI on the side of the Logan Motorway. He offered ABDI a lift which was declined. Despite conducting expansive door-knock inquiries, coupled with media appeals and witness approaches, no evidence of associated crime

*trespass offences on 16 or 17 December 2020 were detected and no other interactions involving ABDI were identified.*<sup>49</sup>

151. Det. Insp. Knight gave evidence in cross examination by Counsel for the Antills that the likely sequence of events was that Raghe had walked past 92 Ulinga Crescent and was captured on the CCTV camera of that residence at 7:42pm. Around 7:45pm, the Antills' neighbour, Ms Ciesiolka, heard a noise and switched on a light. The CCTV camera from across Algester Road captured a figure moving near the Antills' shed towards the pool area at 7:51pm, and this is believed to have been Raghe. Det. Insp. Knight explained that he was of the view that there was a physical confrontation between Raghe and the Antills outside the house and it is likely that Raghe immobilised both of the Antills during this confrontation. At 8:01pm a light went on inside the Antills' house, and this is when it is thought that Raghe went inside to get the knife. He then returned to the pool area and used the knife to inflict the stab wounds on the Antills.
152. The legal representative for Mr Abdi cross-examined Det. Insp. Knight in respect of the findings of his investigation, and whether they were based on facts or assumptions. Det. Insp. Knight, in my view, made appropriate concessions that not all of his findings, for instance his assumption that Raghe was likely to have assaulted the Antills before entering their house and obtaining the knife, were based on provable facts. He explained that "[he] was the principal investigator and [he] had access to all of the information"<sup>50</sup>, and made reasonable assumptions based on the accumulation of evidence.
153. The thrust of the cross-examination by the legal representative for Mr Abdi was to raise the question of whether Raghe "was at the scene at the time of the murder or happened upon the scene at a later time".<sup>51</sup> This alternative scenario was also raised in written submissions by the family, where it was argued that there is insufficient evidence for me to find, even on the balance of probabilities, that Raghe actually committed the killings, particularly "in light of the fact that despite the ferocity of the knife attacks on [the Antills], the amount of blood found on clothes attributed to Raghe particularly as found in the wheelie bins is quite small".<sup>52</sup>
154. In my view, taking all of the evidence together, there is sufficient evidence for me to be satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, Raghe committed the killings rather than simply happening upon the scene of two killings which had been committed by an unknown third party. There is simply no evidence before me that would suggest that there was any other person involved in the Antill's deaths, and the weight of evidence, as outlined by Det. Insp. Knight, points to Raghe's involvement.

### **Ethical Standards Command Investigation**

155. The ESC investigation concentrated on the circumstances of Raghe's death. A report was provided to the court by Det. A/S/Sgt. Green and outlined her investigation. The ESC interviewed witnesses, including the QPS officers who fired the shots, other witnesses and officers from the QCJTT. Statements were taken from members of Raghe's family, a process which was facilitated by their

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<sup>49</sup> C1 – Coronial Report, page 16.

<sup>50</sup> Transcript, Day 1, T30L5.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, T29L38.

<sup>52</sup> Submissions on behalf of Mr Abdi, para 13.

solicitor. Body worn and dash camera footage of Raghe's movements and of his final moments was obtained and reviewed.

156. In addition, expert opinion was obtained by Det. A/S/Sgt. Green as to whether the use of force by the QOS officers who fired the shots was reasonable and in accordance with QPS policy and procedure. This will be discussed further below in respect of Issue 6.
157. Det. A/S/Sgt. Green also conducted investigations into Raghe's EMD and the way in which it was monitored and, as a result of her investigations, made a number of recommendations to the QJCTT which will be discussed further below.

### **SCTC Investigation of the deaths**

158. Following Raghe's death, a QPS SIO was appointed by the SCTC to investigate "the security threat environment, including whether there was a threat of further terrorist acts."<sup>53</sup>
159. A report, dated 1 February 2022, was provided to the court by SIO Det. A/Chief Supt. Lowe, who advised that, immediately following the deaths:

*...[i]t was unknown at this time whether Raghe Abdi had been influenced by others to act, he had influenced others to act or whether his death in such circumstances would influence others to commit an act of terrorism. The [investigation] focused on preserving the safety of the Queensland community.<sup>54</sup>*

160. Once the link to the deaths of the Antills was known, the SCTC investigators worked with the homicide investigators to determine the circumstances of those deaths and Raghe's involvement in them. Raghe's family and associates were interviewed to determine his possible intent and activities before his death.
161. As a result of these investigations, Raghe's activities with Mr Angolo and Mr Yombi became known to investigators. ASIO has advised that this information, which was not obtain by ASIO or other agencies until after Raghe's death,:

*...indicates that Abdi may have had an intention in late November 2020 to obtain three ski masks, three pairs of gloves and three machetes. There was no further context in the information to suggest the nature of Abdi's interest in these items. As far as ASIO is aware, Abdi did not obtain any of these items prior to his death. He also did not use any items of this nature in the attack on Mr and Mrs Antill.<sup>55</sup>*

162. On 21 December 2020, Raghe's sister provided Raghe's laptop to QPS and advised that Raghe had the phone and laptop with him before he left her car. Examination of the laptop did not provide any evidence of relevance. On 22 December 2020, investigators located Raghe's mobile phone in the Parkinson duckpond, it was damaged.
163. Det. A/Chief Supt. Lowe advised, in his report, that:

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<sup>53</sup> C2 - Addendum Coronial Report (Lowe), para 29.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> B2 – ASIO Submission, para 36.

*[the SCTC] investigation concluded Raghe Abdi acted alone and was responsible for the deaths of Maurice and Zoe Antill. The investigations did not identify any forward planning for these deaths.<sup>56</sup>*

164. In addition, Det. A/Chief Supt. Lowe set out at length his views in relation to Raghe's motivation for the attack on the Antills. His conclusion, which he made on the basis of Raghe's overall behaviour, by considering a number of examples of 'directives' by Islamic State leaders to followers on how to commit acts of terrorism, and by ruling out other motives such as robbery and mental health drivers, was that:

*The comprehensive police investigation into the death of Maruice and Zoe Antill found no other likely motivation for this violent seemingly random attack, other than terrorism.<sup>57</sup>*

165. In his evidence at inquest, Det. A/Chief Supt. Lowe explained that he looked at all of Raghe's acts, behaviours and beliefs holistically in order to determine his intent in killing the Antills. He acknowledged that an expert on terrorism, Dr West, had come to a different conclusion about Raghe's motivation (discussed below), but maintained that, in his view, Raghe's intent could reasonably be inferred from his previous interest in jihad and his apparent ongoing radical views. Det. A/Chief Supt. Lowe also explained that he did not come to this conclusion lightly, but that, under the Australia New Zealand Counter Terrorism framework, it is the responsibility of the State investigating agency to determine whether an act is an act of terrorism, and to do so consistently with other jurisdictions.<sup>58</sup>

### **Expert analysis of Raghe's ideology**

166. During the homicide investigation, Det. Insp. Knight briefed Dr Levi West, the Director of Terrorism Studies at Charles Sturt University, Canberra, to provide a report analysing Raghe's beliefs and ideologies. In his evidence at inquest, Dr West explained that the scope of his report was:

*...to try and make an assessment of whether or not it was reasonable to come to a conclusion about whether or not [Raghe] was radicalised in a general sense, and to then try and understand how that may or may not have contributed to his behaviour in relation to the murder, and then in relation to how he ended up on the side of the motorway.<sup>59</sup>*

167. In respect of Raghe's ideology, Dr West noted the observations made by Ms Aden in her statement, which were reinforced by statements by other family and friends, saying that Raghe believed in ISIS ideology. He gave the following explanation of Raghe's behaviours and statements in the context of those beliefs:

*H. ADEN describes her daughters "teasing Raghe about being ISIS" which she explains was a reference to the fact that they perceived him as "a very strict Muslim and didn't like them listening to music and the way they dressed." This practice had continued, according to H. ADEN, for the two years prior to ABDI's death.*

*Salafi-Jihadist ideology generally, and IS ideology specifically, forbids the use of musical instruments. This view can be held and acted upon by particularly pious Muslims, by Salafists who do not embrace violence, jihadist or otherwise, and by others who subscribe to a variety of other conservative interpretations of Islam. When assessed in the context of ABDI's broader behaviours and the accusations made by his*

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<sup>56</sup> C2 - Addendum Coronial Report (Lowe), para 80.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, para 126.

<sup>58</sup> Transcript, Day 5, T40 – 43.

<sup>59</sup> Transcript, Day 4, T4L13.

*mother regarding his support for IS, these views take on additional weight. In the context of the balance of her statements, this belief contributes to a conclusion that ABDI subscribed to the ideology of IS.*

*H. ADEN goes on to describe that in the aftermath of ABDI's attempt to travel to Somalia her son came to her early in the morning and declared "you know what, I'm not gonna hide my religion, I believe in ISIS." This reflects a clear and demonstrable statement of support for and belief in IS, and the associated ideology. ABDI's disapproval of music and the manner of his sister's dress, both conform to IS ideological principles, and support the claim of his mother that he stated the above.*

*His additional reference to "these are the people who will go to Jannah" suggests not only a belief in IS ideology generally, but more specifically in the notion of martyrdom embedded within Salafi-Jihadist ideology and IS ideology specifically. The concept of martyrdom, or dying in the name of God, is a commonly understood concept within Jihadist ideology, and underpins both the concept of becoming a suicide bomber or dying as part of the 'religious' struggle. The reference to 'jannah' does not in and of itself suggest that ABDI was seeking martyrdom, but it demonstrates that he was familiar with the concept and viewed IS operatives and believers as being worthy of the rewards of martyrdom.*

*This also reflects a broader familiarity and comfort with the prospect of death, albeit contextualised within an interpretation that portrays it as a vehicle to God's favour and 'paradise'. It is important to note that this concept frequently results in individuals seeking death as a means of achieving the benefits of 'paradise,' and underpins both the willingness to participate in suicide operations and to participate in conflict with a high likelihood of death. It is also a component of the calculus of undertaking operations that are likely to result in law enforcement engagements that include the use of force, resulting in the death of the operative.*

*H. ADEN also notes that around the same time as ABDI made his comments regarding his support for IS, he also stated "I believe in jihad."*

*...  
ABDI's clear declaration of a belief in jihad represents very strong evidence in relation to his belief in the ideology of IS, and is strong, near explicit evidence of his radicalisation. There is minimal scope for misinterpretation of his statement of support for jihad or for IS.*

*...  
ABDI's articulation of jihad as an obligation on all Muslims, and of the notion of jannah, suggest a reasonable level of engagement with the ideology of, at the very least, jihadism generally, if not IS specifically. This engagement with jihadism is further evidenced by ABDI's statement of support for the previous leader of al-Shabaab (AS). His mother claims he stated in this regard that "the old leader of Al-Shabaab was good" and that "ISIS is good because they follow what the Quran says." These statements further demonstrate ABDI's support for jihadist organisations and their actions. Expression of support for AS, when considered in the context of efforts to travel to Somalia, further strengthen the conclusion that ABDI was radicalised and subscribed to jihadist ideology. AS was first listed as a terrorist organisation in Australia in 2009.*

*...  
According to H. ADEN's statement, on 23 May 2019, ABDI declared his family to be "kuffar." This term literally means unbeliever. Renowned scholar of Islam John Esposito notes that "Islamic fundamentalists in the twentieth century applied the term to other Muslims who did not adhere to their strict interpretations of the Quran." It is noteworthy that of the various terminology related to kuffar, the declaration of someone as being an unbeliever, which is referred to as takfir, "is used in the modern era for sanctioning violence against leaders of Islamic states who are deemed insufficiently religious. It has become a central ideology of militant groups..." It is also worthwhile pointing out that the practice of takfir, which is central to jihadist ideology, is generally disputed by orthodox Islam, and is rarely, if ever, practiced.*

*...*

Lastly, H. ADEN also recounts ABDI instructing her “not to vote in the election and he also said that it was haram to listen to Judge’s or go to court.” These statements reflect a particular jihadist interpretation of a concept called tawhid...

...  
ABDI’s statements and actions...regarding refusal to recognise the authority of the court can be understood in the context of a jihadist interpretation of tawhid, which would view these authorities and structures as illegitimate, and against the true authority of God.<sup>60</sup>

168. Dr West’s analysis of Raghe’s statements and behaviour was that:

*There is ample information to support the assessment that ABDI held radical beliefs and can be assessed as having been radicalised. Further, it is reasonable to assess that ABDI believed in jihadist ideology, and supported IS. With this assessment in mind, some of his actions can be understood as likely being motivated, at least in part, by these ideological tenets.*<sup>61</sup>

169. Dr West’s report outlined known tactics and target selection methods of jihadist terrorists in Western jurisdictions and promoted by IS in Australia and other Western jurisdictions. These include the encouragement of young Muslim men to engage in lone terrorist violence, to use easily accessible weapons such as rocks, knives and cars, and to target law-enforcement with the probable outcome of martyrdom. Dr West concluded that:

*While it is impossible to know the state of mind of ABDI in the period of 16 and 17 December, the above seeks to demonstrate that for individuals that have embraced IS ideology, as ABDI had, the narratives that have been pushed have focused heavily on lone actor operations, on the use of edged weapons in their attacks, and the targeting of law enforcement. These narratives have directly and explicitly shaped the nature of terrorism in Western jurisdictions since 2014.*<sup>62</sup>

170. Dr West considered Raghe’s kinship and social networks and concluded that Raghe was most likely to have been exposed to jihadist ideology through his close association with Mr Abdus Samad. It is likely that Raghe had some access to extremist propaganda material on the internet but, given the extended period during which Raghe knew he was the subject of interest of the QJCTT, he took measures to ensure he did not view or keep radical content on his own devices (those which were able to be examined). Dr West notes that there was no indication that there was a more widespread extremist ideology at the Kuraby Mosque, and that the Mosque’s leaders dealt appropriately with the allegations that Mr Abdus was involved in organising other members of the Mosque for radical purposes.

171. Dr West was asked to consider whether the murder of the Antills and/or Raghe’s engagement with police was influenced by his ideological convictions. Dr West explained in his report that terrorism necessarily involves *instrumental violence*, meaning that “the violence that terrorism involves has a purpose, primarily to communicate a message related to the ideological motivation of the perpetrator”<sup>63</sup>.

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<sup>60</sup> C1.48 – Report of Levi West, pp 21 – 27.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, pp 27 – 28.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, p 35.

<sup>63</sup> C1.48 – Report of Levi West, p 46.

172. In Dr West's view, the murder of the Antills "cannot be described as an act of terrorism".<sup>64</sup> Dr West noted that "[t]errorism is, both in law and conceptually, a specific form of violence that requires certain key elements to be present".<sup>65</sup> He pointed to a number of previous incidents in Australia which have been characterised as terrorist attacks, and concluded that:

*...all of the lone actor jihadist attacks in Australia have involved some form of communicative activity that has made it discernible, to varying degrees of clarity, that the incidents were intended as terrorism, and that the operative was, and sought to make public that they were, a sympathiser with jihadist ideology. It is this communicative aspect that evidences the desire of the operative to either "advance a political, religious or ideological cause"; "coerce or influence;" or "intimidate," as per the relevant sections of the [Commonwealth] Criminal Code.*

*There are no aspects of the murder of the ANTILLs that demonstrates any of these elements. If not for the events of the following morning, the murder would not necessarily have had any terrorism related questions associated with it.*<sup>66</sup>

173. Dr West explained in his evidence at inquest that the key part of his assessment of Raghe's motives was that, in respect of the Antills, there was no 'broadcast' by Raghe of any ideological intent. Dr West admitted that this does not mean Raghe's intent was not ideological, but that there is simply no evidence of it after the fact. Dr West maintained his view under cross-examination by Counsel for the Antill family, although he acknowledged that other explanations were "equally as feasible"<sup>67</sup> as his explanation.

174. In contrast, Dr West said that Raghe's decision to walk along the motorway, his brandishing of the knife to police and his charge towards police "can be understood as an *attempted terrorist attack*, prevented by the response of the QPS officers".<sup>68</sup> Dr West conceded that it is impossible to know what was in Raghe's mind before this incident, but that:

*...[g]iven ABDI's demonstrated radicalisation and commitment to jihadist ideology, and his performative statements of Allahu Akbar and Takbir immediately prior to his attempt to stab the QPS officers, there is a high likelihood that he was motivated, in part, by jihadist ideology.*

*There is some possibility, but it is impossible to evidence, that part of ABDI's reasons for being present on the motorway was to attract the attention of law enforcement and create a circumstance whereby they were required to use lethal force. Beyond the fact that he was in possession of a weapon, which indicates a degree of intent, his actions would be in keeping with the advice provided by IS in numerous items of propaganda, and the practices of numerous Western lone actor jihadists, both in Australia and internationally. As mentioned previously though, it is not possible to know what considerations led ABDI to be on the motorway, and whether he intended to create a situation such as the one that transpired, or whether his actions were reactive. Regardless, his belief in jihadist ideology is highly likely to have informed his actions.*<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p 50.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, p 50.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, pp 49 – 50.

<sup>67</sup> Transcript, Day 4, T31L19.

<sup>68</sup> C1.48 – Report of Levi West, p 51.

<sup>69</sup> C1.48 – Report of Levi West, p 54.

## Expert psychiatric evidence

175. As part of the coronial investigation, Dr Jill Reddan, Consultant Psychiatrist, was briefed to provide an expert psychiatric opinion as to Raghe's state of mind in the last hours of his life, and whether his actions against the Antills and police were a result of a psychiatric condition or episode. Dr Reddan was briefed with material from the police investigations, as well as Raghe's medical records, his autopsy report, and medical records of members of his close family. She was also provided with the report by Dr Davis once it was made available to the court, as well as the transcript of the evidence given by Mr Abdi.
176. Dr Reddan provided her opinion in a report dated 15 November 2022 and gave evidence at the inquest.
177. Dr Reddan's conclusion as to Raghe's state of minds was as follows:

*There is no particular evidence from the material that Raghe Abdi was more impulsive than other young men of his age and in particular, the absence of a clear history of sustained substance abuse is relevant in this regard. There is no clear evidence that he was in the habit of carrying any weapons or becoming involved in street fights. However, there is evidence from the IOMS offender file (Queensland Corrective Services records) that he had become involved in a couple of fights with other prisoners, particularly in June/July 2019.*

*However, this has to be seen in the context of these fights being in a correctional institution where fights amongst male prisoners are quite common. The IOMS offender file also indicates that he refused directions from female correctional staff. There is no evidence from the Statements by family members that he was particularly aggressive towards family members, although it does seem that he considered himself to have authority over his younger siblings and he later felt entitled to damage his step-mother's telephone.*

...

*During [Raghe's time in custody] he was variously in contact with his mother and his father and other associates and he sought for his mother to withdraw previous Statements she had made. It is clear from some of the recordings of conversations (although not all can be heard clearly) that Mr Abdi's father did not support many of his views about their religion, but there is nothing in any of these telephone calls that indicates that Raghe Abdi had a particularly abnormal mental state.*

*However, this is not to suggest that he had not become more extreme or more radicalised in his beliefs than his family members. There is nothing in the prison health records that indicate that during his incarceration, Raghe Abdi was suffering from a serious psychiatric disorder, particularly a psychiatric disorder that involved a pervasive or severely disturbed mood or a psychotic process.*

*The material indicates that Raghe Abdi was offered involvement in a diversion program by Queensland Police, but he did not participate.*

*There is evidence from the material, however, that at various times Raghe Abdi was in conflict with his father. However, when he left prison during early September 2020, he resided at the home of his father and stepmother and he was fitted with an ankle electronic monitoring device on 4 September 2020. There were conditions upon his bail and those conditions included a curfew, from 11:00pm at night to 6:00am.*

*During that time, he spent time at his mother's residence babysitting her two younger children whilst his mother worked as an Uber driver. There was evidence to suggest that he was anxious about surveillance of him, complaining that at various times, police or agents of ASIO were watching him.*

*There is nothing in these concerns that suggests a psychotic process and friends who saw him during the latter part of 2020 noted that he was calm and seemed normal (for example, the Statement of Witness Sharma-Arke Abdulle, dated 21 December 2020). There was, however, some concerning developments in that it appears from the Statements of Mohammed Al-Bahnsawi (dated 22 December 2020) and Montasr Angolo (dated 15 January 2021) that Raghe Abdi was preparing to become involved in a criminal enterprise.*

*Mr Angolo in particular admits that he and Raghe Abdi were planning to rob a drug dealer as they had been informed that the drug dealer kept money in the backyard and that the drug dealer resided somewhere in Mansfield.*

*His family, particularly his father, saw him as becoming disturbed and anxious about difficulties obtaining work ostensibly due to the curfew, but probably more related to the electronic monitoring device, material about him on the internet and there is reference to him having difficulty with and alleging that agencies were shutting his bank accounts, yet the material indicates that he did have at least one bank account.*

...  
*The murders of Maurice and Zoe Antill were purposive acts and they reflect significant rage and a determination to kill them, but it is not entirely clear what he did between the killing of Mr and Mrs Antill and when he emerged onto the Logan Motorway at approximately 0530am on 17 December 2020.*

*There is no evidence to indicate that he could have had any abnormal beliefs about Mr and Mrs Antill personally. In particular, terrorism-related murders usually are conducted in a way so as to obtain considerable publicity or a message is left to make clear that there is a particular set of beliefs being acted out. I would thus agree with Dr Levi West that there is no evidence that the murders of the Antill's were related to any particular ideology or were a demonstration of any ideology.*

...  
*Although Dr West concluded that Raghe Abdi's actions towards the police on the morning of 17 December 2020 was likely at least in part to be ideologically motivated, and I would not disagree with this, it was almost certainly not the only motivation.*

*However, there is no evidence to suggest that his motivation was the product of a mind out of contact with reality; that is a psychotic mind, even if he was in a state of high emotional arousal.*

*The autopsy report on Raghe Abdi revealed that he had a mild lymphocytic meningitis, however, there is no evidence that it was any more than mild and most lymphocytic meningitis' are due to viral meningitis.*

*There is no mention of any illness he had developed in any of the material and it is very unlikely that this had a significant impact on his mental state. There is no evidence to suggest that he had any symptoms of significant or acute brain disturbance, such as a delirium.<sup>70</sup>*

178. In her evidence, Dr Reddan distinguished the killing of the Antills from Raghe's actions on the motorway just before he was shot, by saying that the former lacked "performative acts",<sup>71</sup> or acts intended to "send a message".<sup>72</sup> She explained that this was the reason that she agreed with Dr West's conclusion that the killing of the Antills was not obviously motivated by terrorism.
179. In respect of whether Raghe's actions were the result of a psychiatric condition or episode, Dr Reddan concluded that:

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<sup>70</sup> 11 – Report of Dr Reddan, pp 6 – 12.

<sup>71</sup> Transcript, Day 6, T6L5.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

*...I cannot find any credible evidence that Raghe Abdi's state of mind at the time of the murder of Mr and Mrs Antill and in relation to the subsequent actions he took against police, was as a result of a serious psychiatric condition even though the evidence suggests that he was in a rage when he left his family members and the facts surrounding the murders of Maurice and Zoe Antill are consistent with rage.*

*It may well be as suggested in the material, that he was feeling unfairly persecuted and/or despondent during the months before these events but there is also evidence from witnesses that he was seeking to return to study. On the other hand, there is evidence from witnesses, as alluded to earlier that he was becoming involved in a criminal enterprise.*

*It is possible that the altercation during the afternoon of 16 December 2020, aroused in Raghe Abdi a fear of rejection by his father and a perception of no return (including a belief that his bail would probably be revoked) but commentary about his subsequent emotional state is speculative.*

*There is no evidence of a delirium arising from any cause or of a psychotic condition or of a serious disturbance of mood that was such as to profoundly or morbidly affect his interpretation of the actions of others.<sup>73</sup>*

180. Dr Reddan was also asked to comment on any other relevant issues and accordingly, concluded her report as follows:

*Although Raghe Abdi's ultimate actions toward police resulted in the shooting, there is very little evidence that he was seeking out police or other agencies that morning or during the previous weeks or months after he was granted bail, to attack them.*

*There is no clear evidence available to suggest that at the time of his death that Raghe Abdi was actively involved with a network of extremists although his letters addressed to Za'id Abdus Samad during November 2020 might reasonably infer that he had not broken with extremist ideology.*

*Furthermore, it should be noted that the literature has generally determined that although there are psychological substrates to radicalisation and to the willingness to or motivation to use violence to advance political or religious goals, there are no specific psychological factors or diagnoses or a signature profile common to individuals who become extreme in their ideology and violent.*

*Although it is likely that during the developmental tasks of identity formation and separation-individuation, Raghe Abdi was attracted to an identity as a strict Muslim which separated him from his parents, involved an ideology or prescription of behaviours which was superficially appealing and involved the camaraderie of other young male Muslims, there is no evidence of other factors which have sometimes been noted as part of the background to an increasing adherence to violent ideology such as marked social isolation, poor education, prolonged unemployment, poverty, previous substance abuse, thrill seeking and earlier violence or criminality.*

*In relation to the use of electronic monitoring devices, which has an appeal to some, that such devices may inform relevant agencies/authorities where the device is located, but their use does not provide information about where the wearer may actually be or what the wearer is thinking or intending.<sup>74</sup>*

## **Conclusions**

### **Maurice and Zoe Antill's deaths**

181. The findings of a coroner must be based on proof of relevant facts on the balance of probabilities. A coroner also is obliged to comply with the rules of natural

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<sup>73</sup> 11 – Report of Dr Reddan, pp 12 – 13.

<sup>74</sup> 11 – Report of Dr Reddan, pp 13 – 14.

justice and to act judicially. This means that no findings adverse to the interest of any party may be made without that party first being given a right to be heard in opposition to that finding.

182. I agree with the submission of Counsel Assisting that there is sufficient evidence before me to find that, on the balance of probabilities, Maurice and Zoe Antill were killed by Raghe Abdi at their home at 59 Ulinga Crescent, Parkinson, at around 8:00pm on 16 December 2020. It is likely, based on the findings of the forensic pathologist, that Maurice and Zoe were assaulted and knocked out before Raghe used a knife from their kitchen to inflict a number of stab wounds to both Maurice and Zoe. Afterwards, Raghe put his clothes into their bin and changed into clothes he found in their house. He left the property on foot, carrying the knife, Maurice's wallet, and the Antills' car keys. The cause of both Maurice and Zoe's deaths was found to be multiple blunt and sharp force injuries. There is no evidence that any person other than Raghe was involved in the deaths.
183. These are, of course, findings in respect of a significant issue, The principles set out in *Briginshaw v Briginshaw*<sup>75</sup> are applicable. This means that the more significant the issue to be determined, the more serious an allegation or the more inherently unlikely an occurrence, the clearer and more persuasive the evidence needed for the trier of fact to be sufficiently satisfied that it has been proven to the civil standard. In my view, the evidence obtained during the police investigation of the Antills' deaths, in its totality, is clear and persuasive enough for me to make these findings. In circumstances where there are no witnesses to the murders, is reasonable and inevitable that investigators must engage in some speculation, based on the evidence which is available, in order to piece together the most likely course of events.

#### Raghe's death

184. By contrast, it requires no speculation to make findings as to the circumstances of Raghe's death. Raghe's death was captured on CCTV and QPS officers body worn camera. On the basis of this evidence, I find that Raghe Abdi died after being shot by QPS at around 6:15am on 17 December 2020. Raghe was walking on the shoulder of the Logan Motorway near the Gateway interchange. After he was approached by two QPS officers, Raghe took a knife out of his pocket and yelled "Allahu Akbar". The QPS officers drew their handguns and called on Raghe to drop the knife. Raghe advanced towards the QPS officers, repeatedly shouting "Allahu Akbar". The QPS officers backed away, but when Raghe suddenly charged towards Const. Lavery, shouting "Takbir", both QPS officers fired shots at Raghe resulting in his death from gunshot wounds.

#### Raghe's motivation for the killings

185. The various investigations into the three deaths concluded that Raghe did not know the Antills prior to that evening, had not planned the killings and acted alone. Raghe's possible motivation for the killings was, as outlined above, an issue on which investigators and expert witnesses gave evidence.
186. There is disagreement as to Raghe's motivation among these witnesses. Det. A/Chief Supt. Lowe gave evidence that, in his view, a holistic assessment of Raghe's actions supported a conclusion that his killing of the Antills was a terrorist act. A declaration was made to this effect by the QPS, and their

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<sup>75</sup> [1938] HCA 34.

investigation of all three deaths was carried out in order to ensure public safety and determine whether there were further terrorist acts to come.

187. In contrast, both Dr West and Dr Reddan's view was that as Raghe did not make any overt 'statement' about the killings or 'broadcast' any particular ideological view prior to or after the killings, then his motivation cannot be proven to have been ideological. Both experts agree that Raghe's motivation may have been ideological but say that he did nothing to ensure that his intent was known to others.
188. I agree with Counsel Assisting's submission that, although these views differ, it is not necessary for me to make a finding in respect of this question. I do not agree with the submission made on behalf of the Antill family that it is necessary for me to resolve this "evidentiary conflict" given "the public importance of any declaration of terrorism".<sup>76</sup> With respect to the family, a declaration of terrorism is the province of the QPS and is made with a different intent than assessments made by those giving expert ideological and/or psychiatric evidence. .
189. In this case, it was prudent for the QPS to interpret Raghe's motivation broadly, in order that sufficient and appropriate investigations could be carried out to ensure that there were no other attacks planned nor any other radicalised persons who might have been acting with Raghe. The declaration that the killing of the Antills was a terrorist act was made with the protection of the public in mind. For Dr West and Dr Reddan, who were asked to make a theoretical determination based on the available evidence, it was, in my view, correct for them to be more circumspect in their assessments.
190. Ultimately and tragically, no one will ever know Raghe's true motivation, and there can be no firm answers for the Antills or for Raghe's family in respect of this issue.

### **Issue 3 – Was State and Commonwealth monitoring of Raghe prior to and following his release on bail sufficient?**

#### **QJCTT Report**

191. The QJCTT have provided an investigation report, prepared by their Senior Investigating Officer, Det. Supt. Anthony Conway, who was also the Senior Officer in Operation Slangenburg. The report outlines the structure and purpose of the QJCTT and their involvement with Raghe from March 2018 until his death. Det. Supt. Conway gave evidence at the inquest.
192. In his report, Det. Supt. Conway advised that:
- The QJCTT conducts counter terrorism operations with the intention of disrupting terrorism activities and/or bringing criminal prosecutions for breaches of terrorism legislation. The QJCTT also contributes to a coordinated response to terrorism incidents in the State of Queensland.<sup>77</sup>*
193. In his evidence at inquest, Det. Supt. Conway explained that 'disrupting terrorism' involved "conducting traditional criminal investigations in relation to terrorism offences under the Criminal Code", preventing potential terrorist acts before they

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<sup>76</sup> Submissions on behalf of the Antill family, para 8.

<sup>77</sup> B3 – QJCTT Report, para 7.

occurred and attempting to divert persons who may be “on the pathway to radicalisation”.<sup>78</sup>

194. Det. Supt. Conway was asked in cross-examination by the solicitor for Mr Abdi whether he was aware that, while Raghe was in jail, he had expressed a willingness to meet with police from the EDP but was concerned about his safety if they visited him in jail. Det. Supt. Conway gave evidence that the QJCTT were not involved in the specifics of the discussions between Mr Abdi and the EDP, but that:

*Having said that, though, if there was ever an in or an opportunity to engage with Abdi we would have capitalised on it. And I have no doubt that if it required to move Raghe to a particular area to provide services to him - for us that's not a difficult task to implement, to move someone or put someone in a location where they feel safe to engage with them. So if those conversations did occur and Abdi did indicate, "You know what, I'm willing to engage with these people, I'm willing to accept their help and their programs," that, in my view, that would have been communicated to us and we would have been very supportive of the QPS EDP team to do whatever they needed to do to allow him to engage with those programs because that's what we wanted from day dot.<sup>79</sup>*

195. During his evidence at inquest, Det. Supt. Conway gave the following information in respect of specific aspects of the investigation:

- The QJCTT were never able to recover any information from the ‘boiled phone’ which Raghe gave to Mr Abdulle before attempting to travel to Somalia;
- The conditions placed on Raghe when he was given bail were agreed to by the QJCTT and were considered to be sensible conditions and were more stringent than would have been able to obtain under an interim control order;
- In respect of the monitoring of Raghe’s EMD, there was already a protocol in place whereby QPS would be notified of any alert or breach, but QJCTT proactively put a secondary alert on so they would be notified immediately at the same time as the QPS;
- The QJCTT also undertook physical monitoring of Raghe after his release to ensure that he was complying with his bail conditions. The QJCTT surveillance was covert. In addition to this, ASIO undertook own security investigation; and
- The National Australia Bank contacted the QJCTT to seek advice as to whether they should block Raghe from applying for an account, and Det. Sup. Conway advised that they would prefer him not to be blocked, as the priority for the QJCTT was for Raghe to continue a normal life and to gain employment.

196. Det. Supt. Conway confirmed, during his evidence, that during September and November the QJCTT:

*...were focused on two things: one, monitoring Mr Abdi's bail compliance and being prepared to respond to any breaches as well as looking for opportunities that might arise*

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<sup>78</sup> Transcript, Day 2, T64L27.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, T100L45.

*to collect evidence in relation to the investigation that was occurring prior to Mr Abdi going into custody, particularly around the attempted travel, you know, identifying lines of enquiry that may come about now that he's out of custody.*<sup>80</sup>

197. Det. Supt. Conway also confirmed that, during that period, the QJCTT did not identify any breaches of bails by Raghe, nor anything in his actions which raised particular concern.

### **ASIO Submission**

198. On 4 August 2021, the Coroners Court required ASIO to provide an unclassified submission detailing their involvement with Raghe. The submission covers ASIO's purpose and mission, their involvement in the QJCTT, and their 'coverage' of Raghe while he was alive.

199. ASIO advised that its officers were involved in monitoring and surveillance of Raghe, in consultation with the QPS and the AFP, intermittently from 4 September 2020 after his release on bail to 16 December 2020. The ASIO Report provided to the court advised that:

*On the information held by ASIO in the lead up to 16 December 2020, there was nothing to indicate that Abdi was intending and/or preparing to engage in behaviour of security concern. The information available seemed to indicate that Abdi was making positive plans for the future, and that his family were encouraging him to 'move on with his life' and to not associate with his old friends.*

*ASIO is not aware of any connection existing between Abdi and Mr and/or Mrs Antill before their deaths.*

*Before 16 December 2020, ASIO was not aware of any intelligence indicating that Abdi's ideological views were escalating, or that he had any intention or plans to engage in behaviour of security.*<sup>81</sup>

### **Conclusions**

200. In his report, Dr West commented that:

*It's reasonable to state, based on conversations with the personnel involved in Raghe's case, that the full spectrum of available and appropriate counter-terrorism and CVE measures was deployed in seeking to assist Raghe to reorientate his trajectory.*<sup>82</sup>

201. He explained further, in his evidence at inquest, that the QJCTT "tried all of the available tools",<sup>83</sup> in an "individualised way"<sup>84</sup> to divert Raghe from the path that he had chosen. Dr West confirmed that his view was that neither Raghe's death, nor the Antills' deaths, "were the result of policy failures or operational failures by government",<sup>85</sup> and that he could not see anything that the QCJTT could have done "that would have prevented either of those incidents from taking place".<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Transcript, Day 2, T85L15.

<sup>81</sup> B2 – ASIO Submission, paras 33 - 35.

<sup>82</sup> C1.48 – Report of Levi West – pp 58.

<sup>83</sup> Transcript, Day 4, T15L19.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, T15L27.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, T15 - 16.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, T16L11.

202. I find that State and Commonwealth monitoring of Raghe prior to and following his release on bail was sufficient. In addition, I find that there was nothing more that the State or Commonwealth could have reasonably done to prevent the three deaths the subject of this inquest.

**Issue 4 – Was the monitoring of Raghe’s EMD by QPS sufficient?; and**

**Issue 5 – Are QPS policies and procedures relating to EMDs sufficient?**

203. It is convenient to deal with these two issues together.

204. The EMD is a device which monitors the bailee’s movements using GPS tracking. At the time that Raghe was issued with an EMD, the devices were supplied and monitored by the BroadSpectrum Monitoring Centre, which held the data relating to the bailee’s movements, and notified QPS, in accordance with the agreed ‘Alert Service Protocols’ and ‘Alert Webform Script’, of any breaches of bail conditions or if the devices are tampered with. BroadSpectrum<sup>87</sup> advised that, in accordance with the ‘Alert Service Protocols’, they notified QPS by webform which goes to Policelink for minor alerts, or they call 000 for ‘critical’ alerts such as a tamper alert.

205. Det. A/S/Sgt. McCann gave evidence at inquest that the QJCTT were aware that the company which monitored the EMDs, BroadSpectrum, would notify QPS of any alerts on the EMD. At 4:48pm on 4 September 2019, the same day that Raghe was issued his EMD, Det. A/S/Sgt. McCann sent an email to the QPS GPS Tracking Bail Management requesting that his contact details (QPS landline, email address and personal mobile) be added to the notification profile to be notified if Raghe breached his bail conditions. Det. A/S/Sgt. McCann had given his personal mobile number as he did not carry his police-issue mobile with him when he was off-shift. Det. A/S/Sgt. McCann explained to the court that he requested that his contact details be added to the list so that QJCTT could be notified in real time if Raghe breached his bail conditions. In his statement, he explained that:

*....at least if the uniform [QPS Officers] get out there and they can’t find [Raghe], which was what I was worried would occur, then I can be called, so then I’m going to be 20, 30 minutes behind the eight ball. So then I can roll our, our JCTT Command can roll out everything we need to do, to try to find this human being. Because usually with somebody that we’re monitoring or you know we’re trying to manage on bail, if they take their bracelet off, they’re going to do something really bad. And that’s what we try to alleviate, so that was one element of it. The second part I guess we were having the conversation, we had this conversation quite a lot with CDPP, around getting Justices to understand that bail monitoring doesn’t assist us to keep the community safe. I know it’s a bit of a different area [Counter-Terrorism] because it is all about risk.<sup>88</sup>*

206. Det. A/S/Sgt. McCann’s request was passed on to BroadSpectrum and they confirmed that his details had been added, and he would receive an automatic notification, in addition to the usual webform or 000 notification, if there was a breach or an alert on Raghe’s EMD. Belinda Farrell, Contract Manager for Ventia, which has acquired BroadSpectrum since the events involving Raghe, confirmed in her evidence that, due to human error, Det. A/S/Sgt. McCann’s

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<sup>87</sup> Now Ventia Australia Pty Ltd.

<sup>88</sup> B1.26.1 – McCann ESC interview, pp 29 – 30.

mobile number was not added to the notification profile, although it seems that his email address was.

207. Ms Farrell advised the court that, since this error was identified, “we have established an audit register that monitors who we have automatic notifications established for, as well as retaining the historical information of who we have previously had automatic notifications established for.”<sup>89</sup> She also explained that “it is an extremely uncommon request to be asked to establish automatic notifications. For example, in the last six or seven months, I can only think of one example of the company being requested to set up automatic notifications.”<sup>90</sup>

#### ESC Preliminary recommendations to QJCTT

208. In January 2021 Det. A/S/Sgt. Green of the ESC made the following preliminary recommendations to the QJCTT as a result of their investigation into Raghe’s death:

- *The introduction of a QJCTT 24 hour monitored “Hotdesk/on call” email address and contact mobile number with backup redundancy to replace an email alert sent to an individual investigator who is not necessarily working or on call;*
- *Clarification of QPRIME alerts available to the Police Communications Centre and first responders to assist better assessment and prioritisation;*
- *Improved contact processes from Broadspectrum. This is linked to both QJCTT “Hotdesk/on call” notifications and linked to improvements to QPRIME flags;*
- *EMD tamper alert notifications (and other alerts deemed necessary) to generate a communications message to the relevant supervisor/DDO/RDO for overview of response; and*
- *Increased information and advice required to mitigate the risk to first offenders.*<sup>91</sup>

209. Inspector Heath Hutchings of the QJCTT Security Operations provided a response to each recommendation on 2 June 2021, as follows:

- Recommendation 1 – A generic QJCTT email address and an on-call mobile phone number monitored by a Senior Sergeant would be used as a backup redundancy to the contacts of the on-call investigation team.
- Recommendation 2 – The use of QPRIME entries has been re-enforced with all personnel.
- Recommendation 3 – As per Recommendation 1, future BroadSpectrum alerts will be sent to the generic QJCTT email address and the on-call number.
- Recommendation 4 – As per Recommendation 3.
- Recommendation 5 – appropriate information for first responders is contained in the QPRIME flags.

210. QPS have also provided information to the court in the form of a statement by Acting Senior Sergeant Lisa Byrne, who is the Project Manager for the GPS Management Team within Security and Counter Terrorism Command.

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<sup>89</sup> Transcript, Day 3, T65L29.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, T65L32.

<sup>91</sup> B1 – ESC Coronial Report, p 68.

211. A/S/Sgt. Byrne explained in her statement that Ventia (formerly BroadSpectrum) manage the day-to-day monitoring of bailees fitted with EMDs. The GPS Management team has access to the monitoring dashboard and can view data, including alert data, relating to the bailees at any time.
212. Since 1 December 2022, in her role as Project Manager, A/S/Sgt. Byrne has worked with Ventia to make a number of improvements to the EMD monitoring system. These include:
- Amending the 'Alert Service Protocols' to remove "low" priority alerts and removing the six hour suspension for Communication loss alerts;
  - Re-formatting and re-writing the entire 'Alert Webform script' to remove any ambiguity in the alert information being provided to police;
  - Updated all alert protocols including the Tamper alert protocols and disseminated updated information guides to relevant QPS users;
  - Introduced new information guides in respect of bail variations, medical procedures and EMD indicator lights and disseminated the new information guides to relevant QPS users;
  - Introduced 'Key Points of Contact' in each district across the state, with whom the GPS Monitoring team regularly engage to provide updates and receive feedback about issues to do with EMD monitoring;
  - Created a District Tasking and Coordination Centre information guide to assist Officers when allocating resources to be deployed to EMD alerts and disseminated to relevant QPS users;
  - Introduced a High Risk Offender flag in QPrime for bailees on bail for serious violent offences, domestic violence offences or counter terrorism offences;
  - Made updates to the Operational Procedures Manual (**OPM**) relating to Electronic monitoring to allow the release of information to be authorised by any Commissioned Officer when there is imminent risk of harm to a person or the community;
  - Organised face-to-face information session on EMD monitoring for officers in the districts; and
  - Liaised with the DPP and with investigating officers to identify practical and manageable bail conditions for bailees fitted with EMDs.

## **Conclusions**

213. I find that the monitoring of Raghe's EMD by QPS was sufficient. In fact, Det. A/S/Sgt. McCann took steps over and above the usual procedures to try to ensure that he was notified immediately if there were any alerts on Raghe's EMD. The fact that he did not receive the tamper alert on 16 December 2020 was due to human error at BroadSpectrum.
214. Given the recommendations made by the ESC following the investigation into Raghe's death, which were largely accepted by the QJCTT, and the subsequent improvements made by QPS as outlined by A/S/Sgt. Byrne, I find that QPS policies and procedures relating to EMDs are, currently, sufficient.

## **Issue 6 – Was the police use of force in respect of Raghe appropriate?**

215. Both of the QPS officers who approached Raghe on the Logan Motorway early on 17 December 2020 gave evidence during the inquest. Const. Ross told the court that, at the time that he was given the job, he intended to locate the man

who had been reported walking on the side of the motorway, and to “provide assistance in whatever way I could”.<sup>92</sup> Const. Ross said that, once Raghe had pulled the knife out from his pocket and the QPS officers had drawn their guns, he yelled at Raghe to drop the knife and walked backwards, as he was “trying to withdraw, to give [Raghe] time to hopefully drop the knife”.<sup>93</sup> Const. Lavery told the court that the officers were initially concerned to get Raghe out of danger, but that once Raghe pulled out the knife and charged at him, he fired shots because he was concerned that his own life was in danger.

#### *Use of force – expert opinion*

216. In respect of Constables Ross and Lavery’s use of their handguns, Det. A/S/Sgt. Green obtained expert opinion evidence from Chief Inspector Allen of the QPS OST. Chief Insp. Allen reviewed the actions of Constables Ross and Lavery with reference to the standards and requirements of the QPS in respect of the use of lethal force as set out in the OPM and as instructed in skills and tactical training. Chief Insp. Allen also considered whether there were “less than lethal force options which were open to Constables Ross and Lavery in the circumstances”.<sup>94</sup>
217. During his evidence at inquest Chief Insp. Allen confirmed that Const. Lavery had been in the QPS for less than a year, and that Const. Ross had around 4 year’s service. Each of the QPS officers had passed their operational skills training at the academy, and Const. Ross had received yearly refresher training thereafter.
218. Chief Insp. Allen noted, at the outset of his report, that:

*With respect to the use of lethal force, recruits and sworn police are instructed not to use firearms against another person except in self-defence or in the defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury; to prevent the commission of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life; to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority; or to prevent the person’s escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives.*<sup>95</sup>

219. Having reviewed all of the circumstances, Chief Insp. Allen came to the following conclusions:

*In reviewing the circumstances of this incident, I have considered the other use-of-force options available to police and their possible application/deployment in this incident as an alternative to the use of lethal force used by Constable LAVERY and ROSS to stop the attack by Mr ABDI.*

*Police made a decision to move towards Mr ABDI as they engaged him in conversation, expressing concern about high volume of traffic. This decision to situationally contain Mr ABDI is consistent with training and policy regarding preventing a person from moving into flowing heavy motorway traffic.*

*Constable LAVERY and ROSS attempted to tactically withdraw and reposition by moving backwards when the knife was produced. Constable LAVERY stumbled backwards after the shots were fired as he attempted to move out of the way of ABDI’s rapid attack. Any other option other than lethal use of force would have been ineffective and potentially resulted in death of grievous injury to LAVERY and potentially others thereafter.*

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<sup>92</sup> Transcript, Day 5, T17L31.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, T18L16.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, T4L21.

<sup>95</sup> B1.49 – Statement of Allen, para 44.

*Regarding the decision to prevent Mr ABDI from moving freely on the roadway near heavy, moving motorway traffic, police actions were in accordance with established QPS Incident Command and use-of-force policy, training and doctrine.*

...

*ROSS clearly attempts to engage Mr ABDI in a calm and appropriate manner in an attempt to influence his behaviour. This was ineffective. Given the speed and aggressive nature of the attack by Mr ABDI there was no reasonable opportunity to attempt further de-escalation in the circumstances. Police attempted de-escalation in accordance with established QPS policy, training and doctrine.*

*I do not consider that Taser or OC spray would have been reliably effective in stopping the attack launched at Const LIVERY by Mr ABDI, there was no safe or tactically sound method for Constable LIVERY or Constable ROSS to safely ensure an effective deployment of these options. Officers would have had to expose themselves to the extreme risk of death or serious injury to attempt deploy those options in the very short time from Mr ABDI presenting the knife and the attack commencing.*

...

*Due to the circumstances and the rapid violent nature of the attack by Mr ABDI, it would have been an inappropriate if not highly risky response to attempt to deploy either a Taser or OC Spray as the likelihood that either would stop the attack is negligible at best. Had police chose to attempt either Taser or OC spray they would have exposed themselves to the likely extreme risk of death or serious injury.*

*I am also of the view that any attempt to deploy the baton, or attempt to apply open hand (wrestling, physical restraint hold, arm and joint locks) or closed hand (punches and leg strikes) tactics would have been inappropriate and a tactically poor decision, as it would have exposed the officers to the extreme risk of death or serious injury. This is because for these options to be effective, officers would need to be able to control the actions of Mr ABDI and the edged weapon he was using as well as avoid the heavy flowing motorway traffic.*

...

*I am of the view that Constable LIVERY and Constable ROSS complied with all Queensland Police Service policies and procedures with regards to the use of lethal force. I am of the view that Constable LIVERY and Constable ROSS reacted appropriately and in accordance with established Queensland Police Service training and doctrine.*

*I am of the view that actions of Constable LIVERY were an act of self-defence from the violent life-threatening attack by Mr ABDI.*

*I am of the view that actions of Constable ROSS were an act in defence of LIVERY from the violent life-threatening attack by Mr ABDI.<sup>96</sup>*

### Findings of ESC Investigation

220. On the basis of this and other information obtained during the ESC investigation, Det. A/S/Sgt. Green came to the following conclusions in her report:

...

- e) *There are no suspicious circumstances associated with the death of Raghe;*
- f) *There is no evidence to support a criminal prosecutions against any person;*

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<sup>96</sup> B1.49 – Statement of Allen, paras 113 – 128.

- g) *The police 'use of force' applications were:*
- *authorised;*
  - *justified;*
  - *reasonable / proportionate / appropriate;*
  - *legally defensible; and*
  - *tactically sound and effective.*
- h) *There is no evidence to support any breach of discipline or misconduct against any QPS police officer regarding Raghe's death.<sup>97</sup>*

## **Conclusions**

221. I find that, in the circumstances, the QPS officers use of force in respect of the shooting of Raghe on the Logan Motorway was an appropriate use of force.

### **Issue 7 – Was the police investigation into the three deaths adequate?**

222. As outlined above, a number of QPS investigations have been carried out as a result of the three deaths. A homicide investigation looked at the circumstances of the Antills' deaths, the ESC investigation considered the circumstances of Raghe's shooting and whether the use of force by QPS officers was appropriate, and the SCTC considered both the QCJTT engagement with Raghe up to the time of his death and whether, following his death, there was any remaining threat to public safety.

223. The inquest heard evidence from each of the Investigating Officers: Det. Insp. Knight; Det. A/S/Sgt. Green; and Det. A/Chief Supt. Lowe as to the steps they took in their investigations, their findings and any recommendations made to improve any identified shortcomings in procedures or policies.

224. I find that there is no evidence that the QPS investigations into the three deaths were not conducted properly, thoroughly and professionally and, accordingly, I find that the QPS investigations were adequate.

## **Conclusions**

225. This is a very unusual set of circumstances, and there are many questions about the deaths of Maurice, Zoe and Raghe which can never be answered. It will be very difficult for Maurice and Zoe's family to hear that we will never know exactly why Raghe took the actions that he did, and equally difficult for Raghe's family to accept that he did, indeed, take those actions.

226. While there are many questions unanswered, there is sufficient evidence for me to be satisfied that Raghe was responsible for Maurice and Zoe's deaths, and that there is nothing to indicate that any other person or persons were involved.

227. Although Raghe was known to the QJCTT, was on bail and was being electronically monitored, it is the case that he was still able to remove his EMD and evade the authorities. This is not a satisfactory set of circumstances, particularly when Raghe was able to cause such harm while unmonitored. However, other than evidencing general support for ISIS and an intention to wage jihad overseas, Raghe gave no indication of his intentions to anyone.

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<sup>97</sup> B1 – ESC Coronial Report, p 70.

Neither his family, to whom he was clearly quite close, nor the various officers who had been engaging with him, had any idea Raghe harboured any intention to take the action that he did. It is perhaps the case that Raghe himself had no particular plans, but rather reacted to a situation in which he found himself while in a heightened state. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that there is nothing more that could reasonably have been done by law enforcement agencies which would have prevented Maurice and Zoe's deaths.

228. I note that when Raghe removed his EMD, there was a delay in the notification of that alert to the QJCTT case officer, and a failure to notify him on his personal mobile number as he understood had been arranged. The evidence before the court is that this failure was due to human error. Again, this is less than satisfactory, but I am satisfied that there have been appropriate steps taken by both the monitoring company and by the relevant law enforcement agencies to prevent such failure from occurring again. Even had the case officer been notified at the time that Raghe had removed his EMD, it is, in my view, unlikely that this would have prevented Maurice and Zoe's deaths. By the time Raghe had removed his EMD, he had already walked away from his family into bushland, and was clearly trying to avoid detection. Searches by his family and by the two local QPS officers failed to find him that evening, and it was only when he chose to walk out onto the motorway the following morning that he allowed himself to be located. There is no evidence before me that the QJCTT had any information or knowledge of Raghe which would have allowed them to locate him at an earlier time sufficient to prevent his actions.
229. Raghe's death occurred when he challenged two QPS officers with a knife, and advanced towards them. I am satisfied that these QPS officers acted appropriately in responding to the threat posed by Raghe at that time, and that their use of lethal force was appropriate in the circumstances.
230. I am also satisfied that the investigations by the various law enforcement agencies into the three deaths were appropriate. The information which has been put before the court as a result of these investigations suggests to me that the QJCTT made every effort while Raghe was alive to divert him from a trajectory in which he was becoming more and more radicalised. After the tragic deaths of Maurice, Zoe and Raghe himself, the various law enforcement agencies took appropriate and extensive steps to determine exactly what had happened, and to ensure public safety in the aftermath of these events.
231. I extend my sincere condolences to Maurice and Zoe's family, and to Raghe's family.

## Findings required by s45

### Raghe Mohamed Abdi

**Identity of the deceased:** Raghe Mohamed Abdi

**How he died:** Raghe Abdi was 22 years old when he died on the Logan Motorway at Drewvale. On the morning of 17 December 2020 police received reports from motorists that there was a man walking along the verge of the motorway. Local police attended, and when they approached the man, he pulled a knife from his pocket and advanced on the officers, yelling “Allahu Akbar”. Officers retreated and called on the man to drop the knife, but he charged and was shot dead by police. The man was later identified as Raghe Abdi, a young Australian-born Muslim man, who was being monitored by the Queensland Joint Counter-Terrorism Team. Raghe was on bail for various minor Commonwealth offences relating to an investigation into whether he was preparing to be involved in a foreign incursion. He was living with his father and family members and was required to wear an electronic monitoring device as part of his bail conditions. On the afternoon of 16 December 2020, the Queensland Police Service was notified that Raghe’s ankle bracelet had been tampered with. Police and family attempts to locate Raghe that afternoon and evening were unsuccessful. After Raghe’s death it was also discovered that he had been responsible for the deaths of Maurice and Zoe Antill which had occurred on the evening of 16 December 2020. The Antills had each been stabbed multiple times in the neck and torso with a knife that appeared to have come from a set in their kitchen. Raghe left no explanation for his actions, and there has been no link found between him and the Antills.

**Place of death:** Eastbound Logan Motorway  
DREWVALE QLD 4116 AUSTRALIA

**Date of death:** 17 December 2020

**Cause of death:** 1(a) Gunshot wounds to the torso

### **Zoe Dorothea Antill**

**Identity of the deceased:** Zoe Dorothea Antill

**How she died:** Zoe Antill was 86 years old when she and her husband, Maurice Antill, were killed at their home. They were killed in what was apparently a random attack by a young Australian-born Muslim man, Raghe Abdi, who was being monitored by the Queensland Joint Counter-Terrorism Team. The Antills had each been stabbed multiple times in the neck and torso with a knife that appeared to have come from a set in their kitchen.

**Place of death:** 59 Ulinga Crescent  
PARKINSON QLD 4115 AUSTRALIA

**Date of death:** Between 16 and 17 December 2020

**Cause of death:** 1(a) Multiple blunt and sharp force injuries

### **Maurice Frederick Antill**

**Identity of the deceased:** Maurice Frederick Antill

**How he died:** Maurice Antill was 87 years old when he and his wife, Zoe Antill, were killed at their home. They were killed in what was apparently a random attack by a young Australian-born Muslim man, Raghe Abdi, who was being monitored by the Queensland Joint Counter-Terrorism Team. The Antills had each been stabbed multiple times in the neck and torso with a knife that appeared to have come from a set in their kitchen.

**Place of death:** 59 Ulinga Crescent  
PARKINSON QLD 4115 AUSTRALIA

**Date of death:** Between 16 and 17 December 2020

**Cause of death:** 1(a) Multiple blunt and sharp force injuries

## Comments and recommendations

232. In accordance with s46 of the Act, a Coroner may, whenever appropriate, comment on anything connected with a death investigated at an inquest that relates to public health or safety, the administration of justice; or ways to prevent deaths from happening in similar circumstances in the future. This includes making recommendations to government and other agencies that changes be made to prevent similar deaths occurring.
233. In this case, given the unforeseeable nature of the deaths, the extensive investigations which have been carried out, and the recommendations which have already been made and implemented, in my view there are no further recommendations which could usefully be made by this court.

I close the inquest.

Stephanie Gallagher  
Deputy State Coroner  
BRISBANE